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Rationality in games and decisions is traditionally understood as requiring that
agents act optimally. However, as pointed out by Simon [64] acting optimally
might be hard. We study how the analysis of games and behaviors changes
when agents are assumed to be rational but computationally bounded, and thus
cannot always act optimally.
We first argue that some observed “irrational” human behaviors can be ex-
plained by viewing people as computationally bounded agents. We show that
adding computation costs into interactive settings have some unintuitive conse-
quences that might lead to behaviors that seem irrational at first. We then con-
sider a dynamic decision problem, and show that some observed human behav-
ior can be actually explained by modeling people as computationally bounded
agents that are doing as well as they can, given their limitations.
We then develop appropriate models of computationally bounded agents
modeled as polynomial-time TM. We study the implications of these models
and use these models to analyze different aspect of economic systems. We first
develop a model appropriate for a repeated game setting and show that prob-
lems that are considered intractable, such as computing a NE in repeated games,
actually become tractable in this model. We then develop a model of computa-
tional games, which are finite extensive-form games played by computationally
bounded players and show an application of this model to the analyzing of
cryptographic protocols from a game theoretic perspective.
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Introduction and preliminaries
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivations and Goals
How do people decide what to do in various situations? How do they choose
the best move out of a set of alternatives? How can we predict what the outcome
of an interaction will be? Such questions have been in the heart of both decision
theory, which is “the theory of rational decision making” [57], and of game the-
ory, which can be defined as “the study of mathematical models of conflict and
cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers” [53].
But what does rational mean here? Traditionally, it has been interpreted as
saying that players act optimally (rationality as optimization) given (their beliefs
about) the other players’ strategies (and of nature). However, as Simon [64] was
the first to point out, agents might have limits on their ability to process infor-
mation and optimize complex problems (bounded rationality), which might ”lead
to substantial computational simplifications in the making of a choice” [64].
One interesting source of such limits is the computational considerations of
the players. These can be both due to inherent computational bounds, so that
implementing the optimal strategy requires computational capabilities they do
not poses (For example, factoring large numbers) or that such strategies have
high computational costs so that it is not worth the effort (For example, exact
Bayesian updates of beliefs). Such consideration can have significant conse-
quences when studying game-theoretic problems.
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1.1.1 Thesis goal: Study the implications of computationally-
bounded agents on the analysis of games and behaviors
Given these considerations, our study of human decision making and strategic
interactions should take into account that players are computationally bounded.
Moreover, an increasing number of economic systems, from modern ad auctions
systems to high-frequency trading, involve strategic interactions by computer
programs. Analyses of such systems require models that take the different par-
ticipants’ bounded capabilities into account. Our main goal in this thesis is then:
To study how the analysis of games and behaviors changes when agents are
rational but computationally bounded, and thus cannot always act opti-
mally?
This thesis tackles two different aspects of this goal:
• We argue that some observed “irrational” human behaviors can be ex-
plained by viewing people as computationally bounded agents that are
doing as well as they can, given their limitations.
• We develop appropriate models of computationally bounded agents,
study the implications of these models and use these models to analyze
different aspect of economic systems.
To accomplish these goals we combine tools and ideas from various fields such
as game theory, decision theory, behavioral economics, social science and cryp-
tography.
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1.1.2 Approaches for modeling bounded agents
There has been two main approaches for capturing resource-bounded agents in
the decision theory and game theory literature. The first aims to capture the
intuition that sometimes optimization “is not worth the effort”, by charging the
agents for the “complexity” of their strategy. This approach can be traced back
to Good [23] who pointed out that “we must weigh up the expected time for
doing the mathematical and statistical calculations against the expected utility
of these calculations”. Rubinstein [61] applied this approach to study the re-
peated prisoners’ dilemma game, by assuming the players can only use strate-
gies implemented by a finite automaton and charging them for the number of
states in the automaton. (See Kalai [43] for a survey of other related results
using this approach.) Ben-Sason, Kalai and Kalai [4] studied a class of games,
where, in addition to the payoffs from the game, each player has a cost associ-
ated with each action she is playing, regardless of the other players’ strategies.
These ideas were generalized by Halpern and Pass [27]. In their framework, a
player’s strategy involves choosing a Turing machine (TM), and the complexity
cost of the strategy is a function of the machines chosen by all the players and
of the input.
A second approach is to instead of explicitly charging for the complexity
of a strategy, to only consider strategies in a set of strategies with bounded
complexity. This approach was initiated by Neyman [54], who showed that
it can be used to explain cooperation in repeated prisoners’ dilemma if the
players can only use a finite-automaton of a fixed size. (See [Papadimitriou
and Yannakakis 1994] and the references therein for other related results using
this approach.) Megiddo and Wigderson [52] considered instead bounded-state
4
Turing machines to get similar results. Urbano and Vila [66, 67] and Dodis,
Halevi and Rabin [14] considered players bounded to strategies implementable
by polynomial-time Turing machines and used cryptographic ideas to solve
game-theoretic problems.
This thesis addresses questions related to both approaches.
1.2 Contributions
Our contributions are split into two main parts. The first part of the thesis is fo-
cused on explaining human behavior and well-studied decision biases by view-
ing people as computationally-bounded. The second part of the thesis models
players as polynomial-time TMs and develops tools to analyze such models, as
well as study the implications of some of these models on fundamental ques-
tions in the intersection of game theory and computer science.
1.2.1 Human behavior as rational bounded agents
On the advantage of having high computational cost (Section 3)
We study a very basic question: does having high computational costs always
hurt you? Or in other words, given an opportunity to reduce her costs, will a
player always accept that? We first give simple examples where even if we im-
prove a player’s utility in every action profile, her payoff in equilibrium might
be lower than in the equilibrium before the change. This is because keeping
her high cost gives her a credible threat against the other players. We pro-
5
vide some conditions on games that are sufficient to ensure this does not occur,
which basically correspond to having strict competition. We then show how
this counter-intuitive phenomenon can explain real life phenomena such as free
riding, and why this might cause people to give signals indicating that they are
not as “smart” as they really are.
Modeling people as rational Finite automata in dynamic environments (Sec-
tion 4)
We show that by modeling people as bounded finite automata, we can capture
at a qualitative level human behavior observed in experiments. We consider
a decision problem with incomplete information and a dynamically changing
world, which can be viewed as an abstraction of many real-world settings. We
provide a simple strategy for a finite automaton in this setting, and show that
it does quite well, both through theoretical analysis and simulation. Thus, al-
though simple, the strategy is a sensible strategy for a resource-bounded agent
to use. Moreover, at a qualitative level, the strategy does exactly what people
have been observed to do in experiments.
1.2.2 Models for computationally bounded agents
Computing a NE for repeated games played by polynomial-time TMs (Sec-
tion 5)
We study the problem of computing an -Nash equilibrium in repeated games.
Earlier work by Borgs et al. [8] suggests that this problem is intractable. We
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show that if we make a slight change to their model—modeling the players as
polynomial-time Turing machines that maintain state —and make some stan-
dard cryptographic hardness assumptions (the existence of public-key encryp-
tion), the problem can actually be solved in polynomial time. Our algorithm
works not only for games with a finite number of players, but also for constant-
degree graphical games.
As Nash equilibrium is a weak solution concept for extensive-form games,
we additionally define and study an appropriate notion of a subgame-perfect
equilibrium for computationally bounded players, and show how to efficiently
find such an equilibrium in repeated games (again, making standard crypto-
graphic hardness assumptions).
A model for extensive-form games played by polynomial-time TMs (Sec-
tion 6)
We define a model of a computational game, which is a sequence of games
that get larger in some appropriate sense, aimed at modeling computationally
bounded players playing a fixed finite game. We define what it means for a com-
putational game to represent a single finite underlying extensive-form game.
Roughly speaking, we require all the games in the sequence to have essentially
the same structure as the underlying game, except that two histories that are
indistinguishable (i.e., in the same information set) in the underlying game may
correspond to histories that are only computationally indistinguishable in the
computational game.
We define a computational version of both Nash equilibrium and sequential
7
equilibrium for computational games, and show that every Nash (resp., sequen-
tial) equilibrium in the underlying game corresponds to a computational Nash
(resp., sequential) equilibrium in the computational game.
One advantage of our approach is that if a cryptographic protocol repre-
sents an abstract game, then we can analyze its strategic behavior in the ab-
stract game, and thus separate the cryptographic analysis of the protocol from
the strategic analysis.
1.3 Bibliographic Notes
The material of this thesis is largely based on material from published or com-
pleted papers [62, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34]. The results of section 3 appeared in [62].
The results of section 4 appeared in [30, 31]. The results of section 5 appeared
in [32, 33]. The results of section 6 appeared in [34].
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Normal-Form Games
We define a game G to be a triple ([c], A, ~u), where [c] = {1, . . . , c} is the set of
players, Ai is the set of possible actions for player i, A = A1 × . . . × Ac is the
set of action profiles, and ~u : A → Rc is the utility function (~ui(~a) is the utility
of player i). A (mixed) strategy σi for player i is a probability distribution over
Ai, that is, an element of ∆(Ai) (where, as usual, we denote by ∆(X) the set of
probability distributions over the set X). We use the standard notation ~x−i to
denote vector ~x with its ith element removed, and (x′, ~x−i) to denote ~x with its
ith element replaced by x′.
Definition 2.1.1 (Nash Equilibrium) σ = (σ1, ..., σc) is an -NE of G if, for all players
i ∈ [c] and all actions a′i ∈ Ai, Eσ−i [ui(a′i,~a−i)] ≤ Eσ[ui(~a)] + .
A correlated strategy of a game G is an element σ ∈ ∆(A). It is a correlated
equilibrium if, for all players i, they have no temptation to play a different action,
given that the action profile was chosen according to σ. That is, for all players i
for all ai ∈ Ai such that σi(ai) > 0, Eσ|aiui(ai,~a−i) ≥ Eσ|aiui(a′i,~a−i).
Player i’s minimax value in a game G is the highest payoff i can guarantee
himself if the other players are trying to push his payoff as low as possible. We
call the strategy i plays in this case a minimax strategy for i; the strategy that
the other players use is i’s (correlated) punishment strategy. (Of course, there
could be more than one minimax strategy or punishment strategy for player
9
i.) Note that a correlated punishment strategy can be computed using linear
programming.
Definition 2.1.2 Given a game G = ([c], A, ~u), the strategies ~σ−i ∈ ∆(A−i)
that minimize maxσ′∈∆(Ai) E(σ′,~σ−i)[ui(~a)] are the punishment strategies against
player i in G. If ~σ−i is a punishment strategy against player i, then mm i(G) =
maxa∈Ai E~σ−i [ui(a, a−i)] is player i’s minimax value in G.
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Part II
Human behavior as rational
bounded agents
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CHAPTER 3
I’D RATHER STAY STUPID: ON THE ADVANTAGE OF HAVING HIGH
COMPUTATIONAL COST
3.1 Introduction
We are all familiar with situations where we feel that if only that other choice
was a little cheaper, we could have done so much better, or if our computer was
just a bit faster, we would have been in a much better situation when facing
our competitors, or if the government would have just subsidized our research,
we could have been in a much better position to compete. We next show that
sometimes we were just wrong.
Our motivation for looking at this question comes from trying to understand
if having bounded rationality is always bad for a player. More specifically, we
consider whether decreasing the cost of computation would make an agent bet-
ter off, and most of the examples we give are motivated by this question. How-
ever, our ideas can easily be generalized to any change in the utility of the play-
ers.
When players are bounded to use a fixed sized automaton, Ben-Porath [3]
and Gilboa and Samet [19] showed, as our intuition expects, that a bounded
player has disadvantages against a much stronger player who can use a much
larger automaton. But Gilboa and Samet also showed a somewhat opposite
phenomenon, which they called “the tyranny of the weak”. They showed that
the bounded player might actually gain from being bounded, relative to a sit-
uation where she was unbounded, because being bounded serves as a credible
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“threat”.
We explore this counter-intuitive scenario in the related framework, where,
instead of being bounded, the players pay for the complexity of the strategy
they use. Specifically, we look at the model of Ben-Sason, Kalai and Kalai [4],
where, in addition to the game, each player has a cost associated with each
action she is playing, regardless of the other players’ strategies. We use a version
of this framework to explore the added value for a player from having better
complexity.
Our result are similar in spirits to results obtained for “value of information”,
the added value in expected utility that an agent gets from having information
revealed to her. Blackwell [6, 7] showed that in a single-agent decision prob-
lem, the value of information is non-negative. In a multi-agent environment,
the situation is more complicated, because we need to consider how the infor-
mation that an agent possesses affects other agents’ actions. Hirshleifer [37] and
Kaimen, Tauman, and Zamir [44] showed that, in a multi-agent game, more in-
formation to a single player can result in an equilibrium in which her payoff
is reduced. Neyman [55] showed that if the other players do not know about
a player’s new information, that player’s payoff can not be reduced in equilib-
rium.
Similarly to the idea of value of information we compare games before and
after a change in the utility functions of the players. As Neyman [55] pointed
out, changing a game in such a way creates a totally new game, so by comparing
the utility in equilibrium before and after the change, we actually compare two
different games (for example, the information of the players also changes, since
the game description is different and this is part of their information), so per-
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haps it is not surprising that the results are not always what we might expect.
Nevertheless, we also choose this approach since we feel that, although these
are two different games, their most significant difference is the utility change
and all other changes are caused by it.
We show that decreasing a player’s computation cost (more generally, lo-
cally improving a player’s utility) can lead her to a worse global outcome in
equilibrium (When more than one equilibrium exists, we compare the equilib-
rium with the worst outcome for the player). The player actually loses some
advantages she had from being weak. We also discuss some conditions under
which this can not happen. These conditions correspond to a game with strict
competition.
We then show how this unintuitive phenomenon, that at first might seem
like a problematic aspect of the Nash equilibrium solution concept, can actually
explain real life phenomena. We first show that this can explain free riding,
where a group lets a weak member of it, that does not contribute for the group’s
effort, receive credit for the group’s success. Moreover the weak player has
no incentive to improve and become stronger. We then take an extra step and
show that this advantage of weak players might cause people to give signals
indicating, that they are “stupider” than they really are.
3.2 Example: I dare you to factor
Consider the following game G:
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factor don’t factor
factor 1,1 1,3
don’t factor 3,1 -10,-10
This is an instance of the “chicken” game, where both players are presented
with one large number to factor. A player who factors the number gets a reward
of 1. If one player factors the number and the other does not, then the player
who does not factor gets 3. However if neither player factors the number, they
are both punished and need to pay 10. This game has two pure-strategy equi-
libria in which one player factors and the other doesn’t factor, and one mixed-
strategy equilibrium where they both factor with probability 11
13
and get an ex-
pected reward of 1.
Now consider the following : The year is 2040, Player 1 has a powerful state-
of-the-art classical computer, while player 2 has the newest “Ox” quantum com-
puter, capable of factoring very large numbers efficiently. Both players have a
complexity cost associated with every action they take that is represented as a
complexity function. Player 1 has a complexity function c1, where not factoring
cost nothing, and factoring is not possible, so its complexity is ∞. Player 2’s
complexity function is 0 for both actions. A player’s utility is simply the reward
of the player minus her complexity cost. This game has only one equilibrium:
player 1 does not factor, while player 2 factors. The utility vector in this equilib-
rium is (3, 1).
Now what happens if we change player 1’s complexity function by giving
her an “Ox” computer? Her utilities have obviously improved everywhere, but
does this help her or hurt her? The new game we get is identical to the original
game without complexity costs, and so has two more equilibria . In both new
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equilibria player 1’s utility is only 1 instead of 3. The third equilibrium is iden-
tical to the equilibrium with the old costs. This change made things worse for
player 1, since in the worst case her utility with the new complexity function
is lower than the utility with the old complexity function. What actually hap-
pens here is that when player 1 has only a classical computer, she has a credible
“threat”: she is not going to factor no matter what player 2 does (This is sim-
ilar to removing the stirring wheel from the car in the traditional story of the
chicken game). Thus player 2 must factor. When they both have the “Ox” com-
puter, that threat is gone and player 2 is not going to agree to always factor. If
offered a free “Ox” computer, player 1 will actually refuse to get it.
The next example shows that the player can do strictly worse in all equilibria
by this kind of change to the utilities, not only in the worst case equilibrium.
Consider the following game:
a2 b2
a1 2,1 -2,2
b1 3,1 -1,-1
In this game, player 1 has a dominant strategy b1, which leads to only one
equilibrium, (b1,a2), with utilities (3, 1). Now if player 1 gets a subsidy of 2
when playing a1, we get a different equilibrium, (a1,b2), with utilities of (0, 2).
Note that even the social welfare is worse in this scenario. This change happens
because player’s 1 dominant strategy changed from b1 to a1. When player 1
plays b1, player 2 prefers to play a2. The change in utility for player 1 changes
the dynamics between the two players, which makes player 2 also change her
actions, and leads to a new equilibrium. Getting the subsidy, which improved
player 1 utilities locally, leads to an equilibrium where her utility is lower. What
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actually happens is that when player 1 gets no subsidy for playing a1, player 2
knows she can’t make player 1 play anything that is not b1, so she has no choice
but to play a2. When she does get the subsidy for a1, player 2 knows player
1 will play a1 always so she can play b2. Player 1 can’t threaten player 2 with
playing b1 any more.
These two examples show that changing a player’s utilities so that she is
better off in any strategy profile (improving her complexity function for every
action) might result in an equilibrium in which the player’s utility is lower than
with her old utilities. This happens because having a bad utility for some pro-
files gives a player a threat against the other players. This threat is lost when her
utility gets better, and some actions that were once unacceptable by her might
now be a best response for her to the other players’ choice of actions. This is
used by the other players to change the equilibrium of the game and create a
final result where the player might have lower utility. So, although the player is
better off for any strategy profile chosen, the strategy profile that is an equilib-
rium in the new game is worse for her.
This section showed that, in general games, increasing a player’s utility lo-
cally (or reducing her complexity cost) can result in an equilibrium where her
utility is lower. In a sense, we showed that in some games players actually pre-
fer to be bounded or weak. The next section considers at the special case of
constant-sum games.
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3.3 Constant-sum games
Constant-sum games have some unique characteristics. In particular they are
totally competitive. No one can gain from cooperation. Our intuition is that in
these kind of games, a player can not get hurt by improving her utility function.
In this section, we show that this intuition is correct and what kind of changes
can we make to such games and still have the same effect.
Constant-sum games have the very nice property that by the minimax the-
orem we know exactly how the players play at equilibrium. In particular, we
know that in equilibrium each player plays her defense strategy (her maxmin
strategy) which means she plays the strategy that maximizes her minimum pay-
off - the strategy that gives her the maximum payoff against any strategy the
other player plays. We use this fact to show the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3.1 Let G be a 2-player constant-sum game with utility functions u. Let
G’ be a game with the same action space as G but with utility functions u′ such that for
all −→a , ui(−→a ) ≤ u′i(−→a ), and u′−i changed arbitrary. In equilibrium, player i’s utility in
G’ can’t be lower than in G.
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume that i = 1. Now lets look at any equi-
librium in G’. If player 2 plays the same strategy she plays in the equilibrium in
G, then if player 1 plays the same strategy she plays in G, we know that her util-
ity improved by definition. If she plays another strategy then by the definition
of equilibrium she gets at least as much as with her strategy in G, otherwise she
would want to switch. So in this case player 1’s utility can’t be lower.
If player 2 plays a different strategy than in G, then we know that if player
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1 plays her strategy in G, she gets at least the same payoff. That is because we
know that G is constant-sum, so player 2 minimizes player 1 payoff with that
action in G, so if she now changes action, player 1 could only improve. Using the
same argument as in the previous case, we know that if player 1 plays another
strategy, then she must get more than in G.
This shows that when starting from a constant-sum game, any change to the
game that improves one player’s utility for every action profile can’t hurt her,
no matter what changes are done to the other player. The next theorem shows
that even games that are not exactly constant-sum but are close to them, have
the same characteristics.
The games we consider are games with utility of the form ui(−→a ) = uui (−→a )−
ξi(ai), where uui is the utility player i gets if there was no cost involved, and we
assume the sum of uui over all players is constant for any action profile. With
every action a, player i has an associated cost (or subsidy) ξi(a), and the player
does not gain from other players’ costs. These games are the same as the games
studied by Ben-Sason, Kalai and Kalai [4]. We show that if only one of the
players has a cost for her actions (or the other player has a constant cost, which
is just a constant-sum game with a different constant) then that player can not
lose from changes that improve her utility.
Theorem 3.3.2 Let G be a 2-player constant-sum game, with utility functions
−→
uu. In a
game Gξ in which the utility functions−→u are of the form ui(−→a ) = uui (−→a )− ξi(ai), and
for one of the players ξi is constant, the other player can not lose in equilibrium from a
local improvement of its cost function.
Proof: First assume without loss of generality that player 2’s cost func-
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tion is constant with a value of c, and player 1’s cost improved. We
use the same idea as Ben-Sason, Kalai and Kalai [4]. Given a game Gξ,
we build a game H , that differs from Gξ only in the utilities: we define
uhi (
−→a ) = ui(−→a )+ξ−i(a−i) = uui (−→a )−ξi(ai)+ξ−i(a−i) for i = 1, 2. It easy to verify
that any advantage a player can get from switching strategies in H , she can get
from switching strategies in Gξ. This means that any equilibrium in H is an
equilibrium in Gξ, and vice versa. Let σ1, σ2 be the strategies at an equilibrium
that is worst for player 1 in H , and let Pσi(a) be the probability of playing action
a when using strategy σi. Then:
u1(σ1, σ2) =
∑
a,b
pσ1(a)pσ2(b)u1(a, b)
uh1(σ1, σ2) =
∑
a,b
pσ1(a)pσ2(b)u
h
1(a, b)
=
∑
a,b
pσ1(a)pσ2(b)u1(a, b) +
∑
a,b
pσ1(a)pσ2(b)ξ2(b)
=
∑
a,b
pσ1(a)pσ2(b)u1(a, b) + ξ (ξ2 is constant)
= u1(σ1, σ2) + ξ
This shows that player 1’s utility in any equilibrium in H is her utility in the
same equilibrium in Gξ plus some constant. Moreover when comparing any
two equilibria in H , the difference in the utility of player 1 in them is exactly the
difference in her utility inGξ. This means that σ1, σ2 is also the worst equilibrium
for player 1 in Gξ.
H is a game of the type described in Theorem 1. So, by that theorem, if
we change player 1’s cost function ξ1 to a cost function ξ′1, where she pays no
more than with ξ1 for her actions, player 1 gets at least the same utility in the
20
worst case. We call the games created by changing ξ1 to ξ′1 H ′ and Gξ
′ . By the
same argument as before, the new worst-case equilibrium for player 1 in H ′ is
also the worst-case equilibrium for player 1 in Gξ′ , and the difference between
the utility of player 1 in the worst-case equilibrium for player 1 of H and H ′
is exactly equal to the differences between player 1’s utility in the worst-case
equilibrium for player 1 of Gξ and Gξ′ . This means that in Gξ′ she is also at least
as well off as she was in Gξ.
The next example shows that if both players have non-constant costs this
property fails to hold. Consider the following game:
uu a2 b2
a1 6,0 2,4
b1 4,2 1,5
where the costs are 0 for all actions for all players. The game described has
only one equilibrium: (a1, b2) with utility profile (2, 4). Now consider the situ-
ation where ξ1(a1) = −1.5, ξ1(b1) = 0, ξ2(a2) = 0, ξ2(b2) = −3.5. This game has
only one equilibrium: both players play each action with probability 0.5. The
expected utility is (2.5,1). By changing only ξ1 to ξ′1, which is 0 for both actions,
which obviously locally improve the player’s utility, the equilibrium is changed
back to (a1, b2) with utilities (2, 0.5), and thus the player is globally worse than
before.
This section shows how in constant-sum games, a player can always gain
from a local improvement in her utility, and that it is also true in games which
are close to constant sum games (a change to only one player makes them
constant-sum again). There are of course other changes that can not harm a
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player, even in games which are not constant sum. For example, reducing the
cost of all actions in the same amount (which is just like giving free money no
matter what the player does), or improving the cost of an already dominant
strategy by more than that of other strategies.
3.4 Explaining human behavior as results of this phenomenon
3.4.1 I would rather stay stupid
The phenomenon of free riding is well observed and studied. One flavor of it
occurs when a part of a group gets credit for the work of others without con-
tributing anything. We argue that this can be explained by the weak player’s
advantage we described, and moreover that it also explains why there is a neg-
ative incentive for weak players to improve. We illustrate this by an example
that shows how a weak player gets credit without any contribution, and why
the rest of the group might agree to it.
Consider a scenario where two students have to work on an assignment to-
gether, but they can’t meet and exchange work before its deadline. The assign-
ment has 10 questions. In order to solve each question, you must first have the
answer to the previous question. Both students gain one point for every ques-
tion any one of them solves; if they both solve the same question they still get
only 1 each. This means that their utility can be written as u = max(x1, x2)
where xi is the number of questions student i solves. The first student has a
complexity cost of 0.1 for every question she solves, while the second student
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has a complexity cost of 0.1 for the first 7 question, and a cost of 1.1 for the
rest. This game has only one equilibrium: the first student does all 10 questions,
while the second student free rides (does nothing) and gets the credit. This is
because for every question the second student will solve after the 7th she will
get −0.1 utility, so she will not do more then 7 questions, while the first student
prefers solving 10 question by herself to doing nothing and having the second
student solve only 7 questions. The utility for the second student in this game
is 10.
Now what would have happened if the second student were “smarter”, and
had the same complexity cost as the first student? In this situation, the game
would have one more pure strategy equilibrium (it also has a mixed strategy
equilibrium), in which the second student solves all 10 questions and the first
student does nothing. In this equilibrium, the second student’s utility is 9,
which is lower than before. This shows that the second student has no incentive
to try to get “smarter”. By free riding, she ensures herself the highest utility pos-
sible in this game, while the other student has no choice but to do all the work.
This happens because the second student has a credible threat: no matter what
the first student does, she won’t solve more than 7 questions. This shows that
the second student has no incentive to improve. If she gets smarter she actually
loses the threat and gets a lower payoff.
3.4.2 I am better than I seem
In this section, we explore why people sometimes pretend to be weak, when
they are really not, which is also a well observed phenomenon. Intuitively, we
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show that the reason for this is that acting weak, lowers the expectation from the
players, and allows them to invest less effort. To do that we do not look at the
added value a player gets from better utility, but instead look at a scenario where
a player would rather behave as if she had lower utility, since in equilibrium it
gets her a higher payoff.
We use the spirit of Spence’s [65] signaling model, which is traditionally used
to show how players signal how good they are to the other players, to instead
show that players might sometimes want to do the opposite, and signal that
they are even worse then they really are. Spence shows how education can be
seen as a signal in the hiring market, which helps employers decides the wages
to offer job candidates. He defines an information-feedback cycle, consisting of
the employer’s beliefs, the offered wages as a function of the signals, the signal
chosen by applicants, and the final observation of the hired employees by the
employers (which feeds back into their beliefs). He defines an equilibrium in
this model as a situation where the beliefs of the employer are self confirming,
that is, do not change as a result of the final observation of the employers that
were hired based on the previous beliefs.
We use a variant of this model to show that people might even try to
seem stupider than they really are (or more generally signal that their util-
ity\complexity functions are weaker) to get the power of a credible threat.
Consider an educational institution that wants to divide its students into two
classes, regular and honors. For every student that is placed in the honors class
and is able to pass it, the school gets a utility of 1, but if the student is placed in
the honors class and fails, the school get a utility of −1. For every student that
is placed in the regular class, the school gets a utility of 0. A student has two
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options: she can either relax and easily pass the regular class but fail the honors
class, or she can work hard, in which case she passes both classes. If she passes
a class she gets utility of 100, and if she fails she gets utility of 0.
There are three types of students. A slow student, who has a cost of 100 for
working hard, a moderate student, who has a cost of 7, and a fast student, who
has a cost of 3. The cost of relaxing is 0 for all students. The school would like to
place the slow students in the regular class and the moderate and fast students
in the honors class, but it cannot tell which students fall into each category.
To help it with the process, the school decides to do a preliminary placement
test for students. The test has 10 questions, and the school decides that a student
who solves 7 or more questions will be placed in the honors class. To motivate
the students to perform well, the school offers them the option of skipping one
hour of class without being punished for every question they solve. Skipping
an hour has a utility of 1. The three types of students have different costs for
this test. All students have a cost of 0 for the first six questions. For every
question after that, the slow student has a cost of 1.1, the moderate student has
a cost of 0.5, and the fast student has a cost of 0.2. The school is unaware of
these exact costs (as in the Spence model, where the employer is unaware of the
exact education costs of the different groups), but designs the test knowing that
both the fast and moderate students have a positive incentive to answer all the
questions, while the slow student will not answer more than six.
It is easy to see that in order to maximize their utility, the slow and moderate
students will answer only six questions (giving them utility 106), and the fast
students will answer all ten questions (giving them utility 106.2). Doing badly
in the exam acts as a signal of being slower (and is negatively correlated with
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the utility, as required by the Spence model). Since the only way for the school
to figure out if it did the right thing is to see if someone failed the honors class
(this is slightly different from Spence’s original model, where the employer gets
complete feedback), and no students in the honors class will fail, the school’s
beliefs are self-confirming, so this gives an equilibrium.
As in our previous example, the slow students have no motivation to become
moderate, thus changing from the cost of the slow student to that of the mod-
erate student has value of of 0. The value for both the moderate and the slow
student of getting the complexity of the fast player is positive in this example.
This example shows that people will sometimes prefer to be considered less
smart then they really are, in order to take advantage of the threat of having
higher complexity.
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CHAPTER 4
I’M DOING AS WELL AS I CAN: MODELING PEOPLE AS RATIONAL
FINITE AUTOMATA
4.1 Introduction
Our goal in this section is to better understand how people make decisions in
dynamic situations with uncertainty. There are many examples known where
people do not seem to be choosing strategies that maximize expected utility.
Various approaches have been proposed to account for the behavior of people,
of which perhaps the best known is Kahnemann and Tversky’s [42] prospect the-
ory. As we discussed before, one explanation for this inconsistency between
expected utility theory and real-life behavior has been that agents are bound-
edly rational—they are rational, but computationally bounded. One of the most
commonly-used model of computationally bounded agents has been finite au-
tomata.
Wilson [69] considers a decision problem where an agent needs to make a
single decision, whose payoff depends on the state of nature (which does not
change over time). Nature is in one of two possible states, G (good) and B
(bad). The agent gets signals, which are correlated with the true state, until the
game ends, which happens at each step with probability η > 0. At this point,
the agent must make a decision. Wilson characterizes an n-state optimal finite
automaton for making a decision in this setting, under the assumption that η is
small (so that the agent gets information for many rounds). She shows that an
optimal n-state automaton ignores all but two signals (the “best” signal for each
of nature’s states); the automaton’s states can be laid out “linearly”, as states
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0, . . . , n − 1, and the automaton moves left (with some probability) only if it
gets a strong signal for state G, and moves right (with some probability) only
if it gets a strong signal for state B. Thus, roughly speaking, the lower the cur-
rent state of the automaton, the more likely from the automaton’s viewpoint
that nature’s state is G. (Very similar results were proved earlier by Hellman
and Cover [36].) Wilson argues that these results can be used to explain ob-
served biases in information processing, such as belief polarization (two people
with different prior beliefs, hearing the same evidence, can end up with dia-
metrically opposed conclusions) and the fist-impression bias (people tend to put
more weight on evidence they hear early on). Thus, some observed human be-
havior can be explained by viewing people as resource-bounded, but rationally
making the best use of their resources (in this case, the limited number of states).
Wilson’s model assumes that nature is static. But in many important prob-
lems, ranging from investing in the stock market to deciding which route to take
when driving to work, the world is dynamic. Moreover, people do not make
decisions just once, but must make them often. For example, when investing
in stock markets, people get signals about the market, and need to decide af-
ter each signal whether to invest more money, take out money that they have
already invested, or to stick with their current position.
Here we consider a model that is intended to capture the most significant
features of a dynamic situation. As in Wilson’s model, we allow nature to be
in one of a number of different states (for simplicity, like Wilson, for most parts
we assume that nature is in one of only two states), and assume that the agent
gets signals correlated with nature’s state. But now we allow nature’s state to
change, although we assume that the probability of a change is low. (Without
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this assumption, the signals are not of great interest.)
Our choice of model is in part motivated by recent work by psychologists
and economists on how people behave in such scenarios, particularly that of
Erev, Ert, and Roth [15], who describe contests that attempt to test various mod-
els of human decision making under uncertain conditions. In their scenarios,
people were given a choice between making a safe move (that had a guaranteed
constant payoff) and a “risky” move (which had a payoff that changed accord-
ing to an unobserved action of the other players). Since their goal was that of
finding models that predicted human behavior well, Erev et al. [15] considered
a sequence of settings, and challenged others to present models that would pre-
dict behavior in these settings.
They also introduced a number of models themselves, and determined the
performance of these models in their settings. One of those models is I-Saw
(inertia, sampling, and weighting) [15]; it performed best among their models,
with a correlation of 0.9 between the model’s prediction and the actual observed
results for most variables. I-Saw assumes that agents have three types of re-
sponse mode: exploration, exploitation, and inertia. An I-Saw agent proceeds as
follows. The agent tosses a coin. If it lands heads, the agent plays the action
other than the one he played in the previous step (exploration); if it lands tails,
he continues to do what he did in the previous step (inertia), unless the signal
received in the previous round crosses a probabilistic “surprise” trigger (the
lower the probability of the signal to be observed in the current state, the more
likely the trigger is to be crossed); if the surprise trigger is crossed, then the
agent plays the action with the best estimated subjective value, based on some
sampling of the observations seen so far (exploitation).
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The winner of the contest was a refinement of I-Saw called BI-Saw (bounded
memory, inertia, sampling and weighting) model, suggested by Chen et al. [9].
The major refinement involved adding a bounded memory assumption, whose
main effect is a greater reliance on a small sample of past observations in the
exploitation mode. The BI-Saw model had a normalized mean square deviation
smaller than 1.4 for estimating the entry rate of the players, and smaller than 1
for estimating the actual payoff they get, which was better than the results of
the I-Saw model.
I-Saw and BI-Saw seem quite ad hoc. We show that they can be viewed as the
outcomes of play of a resource-bounded agent modeled as a finite automaton.1
Specifically, we consider a setting where an agent must make a decision every
round about playing safe (and getting a guaranteed payoff) or playing a risky
move, whose payoff depends on the state of nature. We describe a simple strat-
egy for this agent, and show both theoretically and by simulation that it does
very well in practice. While it may not be the optimal strategy if the agent is
restricted to n states, we show that as n goes to infinity and the probability of
nature changing state goes to 0, the expected payoff of this strategy converges
to the best expected payoff that the player could get even if he knew the state
of nature at all times. Interestingly, this strategy exhibits precisely the features
of (I-Saw and) BI-Saw at a qualitative level. Thus, we believe that (B)I-Saw can
be best understood as the outcome of a resource-bounded agent playing quite
rationally.
1 Although the scenarios in [15] are games rather than decision problems, as observed in [16],
learning in a decision problem should work essentially the same way as learning in games, so,
for simplicity, we consider the former setting. The winner of a similar contest for single agent
decision problems (see Erev et al. [17]) was won by a predecessor of the I-Saw model with very
similar behavior modes. In our setting, the agent’s actions do not influence nature, which is
similar to assumptions usually made in large economic markets, where a single agent cannot
influence the market.
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4.2 The Model
We assume that nature is in one of two states G (“good”) and B (“bad”); there
is a probability pi of transition between them in each round. (In Section 4.4, we
show that allowing nature to have more states does not affect the results at a
qualitative level; similarly, while we could allow different transition probabili-
ties fromG toB and fromB toG, this would not have an impact on our results.)
The agent has two possible actions S (safe) and R (risky). If he plays S, he
gets a payoff of 0; if he plays R he gets a payoff xG > 0 when nature’s state is G,
and a payoff xB < 0 when nature’s state is B. The agent does not learn his pay-
off, and instead gets one of k signals. Signal i has probability pGi of appearing
when the state of nature is G, and probability pBi of appearing when the state is
B. We assume that the agent gets exactly one signal at each time step, so that∑k
i=1 p
G
i =
∑k
i=1 p
B
i = 1. This signaling mechanism is similar to that considered
by Cover and Hellman [36]. However, we assume that the agent gets a signal
only if he plays the risky action R; he does not get a signal if he plays the safe
action S. We denote this setting S[pG1 , pB1 , . . . , pGk , p
B
k , xG, xB]. We say that a set-
ting is nontrivial if there exists some signal i such that pBi 6= pGi . If a setting is
trivial, then no signal enables the agent to distinguish whether nature is in state
G or B; the agent does not learn anything from the signals. (Note that we have
deliberately omitted nature’s transition probability pi from the description of the
setting. That is because, in our technical results, we want to manipulate pi while
keeping everything else fixed.) One quick observation is that a trivial strategy
that plays one of S or R all the time gets a payoff of 0 in this model, as does the
strategy that chooses randomly between S and R. We are interested in finding
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a simple strategy that gets appreciably more than 0.2
As suggested by the BI-Saw model, we assume that agents have bounded
memory. We model this by assuming agents which are restricted to using a
finite automaton, with deterministic actions and probabilistic transitions, and a
fixed number n of internal states. The agent’s goal is to maximize his expected
average payoff.
We focus on one particular family of strategies (automata) for the agent. We
denote a typical member of this familyA[n, pexp ,Pos ,Neg , ru, rd]. The automaton
A[n, pexp ,Pos ,Neg , ru, rd] has n + 1 states, denoted 0, . . . , n. State 0 is dedicated
to playing S. In all other states R is played. The k signals are partitioned into
three sets, Pos (for “positive”), Neg (for “negative”), and I (for “ignore” or “in-
different”), with Pos and Neg nonempty. Intuitively, the signals in Pos make it
likely that nature’s state is G, and the signals in Neg make it likely that the state
of nature is B. The agent chooses to ignore the signals in I ; they are viewed as
not being sufficiently informative as to the true state of nature. (Note that I is
determined by Pos and Neg .)
In each round while in state 0, the agent moves to state 1 with probability
pexp . In a state i > 0, if the agent receives a signal in Pos , the agent moves
to i + 1 with probability ru (unless he is already in state n, in which case he
stays in state n if he receives a signal in Pos); thus, we can think of ru as the
probability the the agent moves up if he gets a positive signal. If the agent
receives a signal in Neg , the agent moves to state i − 1 with probability rd (so
2 This model can be viewed as an instance of a “one-armed restless bandit” [68] that does
not have perfect information about the state of the project. This kind of decision problem was
also tested [5], and the model that performed best can be viewed as a predecessor of the I-Saw
model. A similar model was also studied in animal psychology as a model of animal food
gathering [51].
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Figure 4.1: Example of automaton A[4, pexp ,Pos ,Neg , 1, 1]
rd is the probability of moving down if he gets a signal in Neg); if he receives
a signal in I , the agent does not changes states. Clearly, this automaton is easy
for a human to implement (at least, if it does not have too many states). See
Figure 4.1 for an example of such an automaton.
Note that this automaton incorporates all three behavior modes described by
the I-Saw model. When the automaton is in state 0, the agent explores with con-
stant probability by moving to state 1. In state i > 0, the agent continues to do
what he did before (in particular, he stays in state i) unless he gets a “meaning-
ful” signal (one in Neg or Pos), and even then he reacts only with some probabil-
ity, so we have inertia-like behavior. If he does react, he exploits the information
he has, which is carried by his current state; that is, he performs the action most
appropriate according to his state, which is R. The state can be viewed as rep-
resenting a sample of the last few signals (each state represents remembering
seeing one more “good” signal), as in the BI-Saw model.
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4.3 Theoretical analysis
In this section, we do a theoretical analysis of the expected payoff of the au-
tomaton A[n, pexp ,Pos ,Neg , ru, rd]. This will tell us how to optimally choose the
parameters Pos , Neg , ru, and rd. Observe that the most any agent can hope to
get is xG
2
. Even if the agent had an oracle that told him exactly what nature’s
state would be at every round, if he performs optimally, he can get only xG in
the rounds when nature is in state G, and 0 when it is in state B. In expecta-
tion, nature is in state G only half the time, so the optimal expected payoff is
xG/2. One of our results shows that, somewhat surprisingly, as n gets large, if pi
goes to 0 sufficiently quickly, then the agent can achieve arbitrarily close to the
theoretical optimum using an automaton of the form A[n, pexp ,Pos ,Neg , ru, rd],
even without the benefit of an oracle, by choosing the parameters appropriately.
More precisely, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.1 Let Π and Pexp be functions from IN to (0, 1] such that
limn→∞ nΠ(n) = limn→∞Π(n) = limn→∞Π(n)/Pexp(n) = 0. Then for all settings
S[pG1 , p
B
1 , . . . , p
G
k , p
B
k , xG, xB], there exists a partition Pos ,Neg , I of the signals, and
constants rd and ru such that limn→∞EΠ(n)[A[n, Pexp(n),Pos ,Neg , ru, rd]] = xG2 .
Note that in Theorem 4.3.1, Π(n) goes to 0 as n goes to infinity. This require-
ment is necessary, as the next result shows; for fixed pi, we can’t get too close
to the optimal no matter what automaton we use (indeed, the argument applies
even if the agent uses a Turing machine instead of a finite automaton).
Theorem 4.3.2 For all fixed 0 < pi ≤ 0.5 and all automata A, we have Epi[A] ≤
xG/2 + pixB/2.
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Proof: Suppose that the automaton had an oracle that, at each time t, correctly
told it the state of nature at the previous round. Clearly the best the automaton
could do is to play S if the state of nature was B and play R if the state of
nature was G. Thus, the automaton would play R half the time and G half the
time. But with probability pi the state of nature will switch from G to B, so the
playoff will be xB rather than xG. Thus, the payoff that it gets with this oracle
is xG/2 + xBpi/2. (Recall that xB < 0.) We can think of the signals as being
imperfect oracles. The automaton will do even worse with the signals than it
will be oracle.
The theorem focuses on small values of pi, since this is our range of interest.
We can prove a result in a similar spirit even if 0.5 < pi < 1.
The key technical result, from which Theorem 4.3.1 follows easily, gives us
a very good estimate of the payoff of the automaton A[n, pexp ,Pos ,Neg , ru, rd],
for all choices of the parameters. We state the estimate in terms of n, pi, pexp and
four auxiliary quantities, ρGu , ρBu , ρGd , and ρ
B
d , Intuitively, ρ
N
u is the probability of
the automaton changing states from i to i + 1 (going “up”) when nature is in
state N and i ≥ 1, and ρNd is the probability of the automaton changing states
from i to i − 1 (going “down”) given that nature is in state N . Thus, ρNu =
(
∑
i∈Pos p
N
i )ru and ρNd = (
∑
i∈Neg p
N
i )rd. We define σN = ρNu /ρNd . Recall that
when the automaton is in state 0, it does not get any signals; rather, it explores
(moves to state 1) with probability pexp .
Proposition 4.3.3
Epi[A[n, pexp ,Pos ,Neg , ru, rd]] ≥
xG
2
(
1− (ρGu−ρGd )+pi(
∑n
i=1(σG)
i−n)
(ρGu−ρGd )+pexp((σG)n−1)
)
+
xB
2
(
1− (ρBu−ρBd )−pi(
∑n
i=1(σB)
i−n)
(ρBu−ρBd )+pexp((σB)n−1)
)
.
(4.1)
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We sketch a proof of Proposition 4.3.3 in the next section. Although the ex-
pression in (4.1) looks rather complicated, it gives us just the information we
need, both to prove Theorem 4.3.1 and to define an automaton that does well
even when n is finite (and small).
Proof of Theorem 4.3.1: We want to choose Pos , Neg , ru, and rd so that ρGu >
ρGd —the agent is more likely to go up than down when nature is in state G (so
that he avoids going into state 0 and getting no reward) and ρBd > ρ
B
u —the agent
is more likely to go down than up when nature is in state B (so that he quickly
gets into state 0, avoiding the payoff of −1). Suppose that we can do this. If
ρGu > ρ
G
d , then σG > 1, so the first term in the expression for the lower bound
of EΠ(n)[A[n, Pexp(n),Pos ,Neg , ru, rd]] given by (4.1) tends to xG2 (1 − Π(n)Pexp(n)) as
n → ∞. Since we have assumed that limn→∞Π(n)/Pexp(n) = 0, the first term
goes to xG/2. If ρBu < ρBd , then σB < 1, so the second term goes to
xB
2
(
1− (ρ
B
u − ρBd ) + Π(n) σB1−σB + nΠ(n)
(ρBu − ρBd )− Pexp(n)
)
.
Since we have assumed that limn→∞ nΠ(n) = limn→∞ Pexp(n) = 0, the second
term goes to 0.
Now we show that we can choose Pos , Neg , rB, and rG so that ρGu > ρGd and
ρBd > ρ
B
u . By assumption, there exists some signal i such that pGi 6= pBi . Since∑k
i=1 p
G
i =
∑k
i=1 p
B
i (= 1), it must be the case that there exists some signal i such
that pGi > pBi . Let Pos = {i}. If there exists a signal j such that pGj < pBi and
pBj > p
B
i , then let Neg = {j} and ru = rd = 1. Otherwise, let Neg = {1 . . . k} \ {i},
ru = 1, and let rd be any value such that
pGi
1−pBi
< rd <
pGi
1−pGi
. It is easy to check
that, with these choices, we have σG > 1 and σB < 1. This completes the proof
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of Theorem 4.3.1.
As we said, Proposition 4.3.3 gives us more than the means to prove Theo-
rem 4.3.1. It also tells us what choices to make to get good behavior of n is finite.
In Section 4.4, we discuss what these choices should be.
Proving Proposition 4.3.3
Once we are given pi and a setting S[pG1 , pB1 , . . . , pGk , p
B
k , xG, xB], an au-
tomaton A[n, pexp ,Pos ,Neg , ru, rd] determines a Markov chain, with states of
(0, G), . . . , (n,G), (0, B), . . . , (n,B), where the Markov chain is in state (i, N) if
nature is in state N and the automaton is in state i. The probability of transi-
tion is completely determined by pi, the parameters of the automaton, and the
setting.
Let qNi (s, t) be the probability of the Markov chain being in state (i, N) at
time t when started in state s. We are interested in limt→∞ qNi (s, t). In general,
this limiting probability may not exist and, even when it does, it may depend on
the state the Markov chain starts in. However, there are well known sufficient
conditions under which the limit exists, and is independent of the initial state
s. A Markov chain is said to be irreducible if every state is reachable from every
other state; it is aperiodic if, for every state s, there exist two cycles from s to
itself such that the gcd of their lengths is 1. The limiting probability exists and is
independent of the start state in every irreducible aperiodic Markov chain over
a finite state space [58, Corollary to Proposition 2.13.5]. Our Markov chain is
obviously irreducible; in fact, there is a path from every state in it to every other
state. It is also aperiodic. To see this, note that if 0 < i ≤ n, there is a cycle of
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length 2i that can be obtained by starting at (i, N), going to (0, N) (by observing
signals in Neg and nature not changing state) and going back up to (i, N). At
(0, N), there is a cycle of length 1. Thus, we can get a cycle of length 2i + 1
starting at (i, N). Since we can go from (0, B) to (0, G) and back, there is also a
cycle of length 2 from every state (0, N). Since a limiting probability exists, we
can write qNi , ignoring the arguments s and t.
We are particularly interested in the qB0 and qG0 , because these quantities com-
pletely determine the agent’s expected payoff. As we have observed before,
since the probability of transition from B to G is the same as the probability
transition from G to B, nature is equally likely to be in state B and G. Thus,∑n
i=0 q
B
i =
∑n
i=0 q
G
i = 1/2. Now the agent gets a payoff of xG when he is in state
i > 0 and nature is in state G; he gets a payoff of xB when he is in state i > 0 and
nature is in state B. Thus, his expected payoff is xG(1/2− qG0 ) + xB(1/2− qB0 ).
It remains to compute qB0 and qG0 . To do this, we need to consider qNi for all
values of i. We can write equations that characterize these probabilities. Let N¯
be the state of nature other than N (so B¯ = G and G¯ = B). Note that for a time
t after (i, N) has reached its limiting probability, then the probability of state
(i, N) has to be the same at time t and time t + 1. If i > 0, the probability of the
system being in state (i, N) at time t+ 1 is the sum of the probability of (a) being
in state (i + 1, N) (or (n,N) if i = n), getting a signal in Neg and reacting to it,
and nature not changing state, (b) being in state (i−1, N), getting a signal in Pos
and reacting to it (or, if i = 1, the system was in state (i, 0) and the agent decided
to explore), and nature did not change state, (c) being in state (i, N), getting a
signal in I , and nature not changing state, (d) three further terms like (a)–(c)
where the system state is (j, N¯) at time t, for j ∈ {i − 1, i, i + 1} and nature’s
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state changes. There are similar equations for the state (0, N), but now there
are only four possibilities: (a) the system was in state (1, N) at time t, the agent
observed a signal in Neg and reacted to it, and nature’s state didn’t change, (b)
the system was in state (0, N) and the agent’s state didn’t change, and (c) two
other analogous equations where nature’s state changes from N¯ to N .
These considerations give us the following equations:
qN0 = (1− pi)((1− pexp)qN0 + ρNd qN1 )
+pi((1− pexp)qN¯0 + ρN¯d qN¯1 )
qN1 = (1− pi)((1− ρNd − ρNu )qN1 + ρNd qN2 + pexpqN0 )
+pi((1− ρN¯d − ρN¯u )qN¯1 + ρN¯d qN¯2 + pexpqN¯0 )
...
qNi = (1− pi)((1− ρNd − ρNu )qNi + ρNd qNi+1 + ρNu qNi−1)
+pi((1− ρN¯d − ρN¯u )qN¯i + ρN¯d qN¯i+1 + ρN¯u qN¯i−1)
...
qNn = (1− pi)((1− ρNd )qNn + ρNu qNn−1)
+pi((1− ρN¯d )qN¯n + ρN¯u qN¯n−1).
(4.2)
These equations seem difficult to solve exactly. But we can get very good
approximate solutions. Define:
γNi = pi((1− ρN¯d − ρN¯u )qN¯i + ρN¯d qN¯i+1 + ρN¯u qN¯i−1)
−pi((1− ρNd − ρNu )qNi + ρNd qNi+1 + ρNu qNi−1)
for i = 2, . . . , n;
γN1 = pi((1− ρN¯d − ρN¯u )qN¯i + ρN¯d qN¯i+1 + pexp
−pi((1− ρNd − ρNu )qNi + ρNd qNi+1 + pexp);
γN0 = pi((1− ρN¯d )qN¯n + ρN¯u qN¯n−1)− ρN¯d qN¯1 .
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Note that γNi is essentially a subexpression of qNi . Intuitively, γNi is the net prob-
ability transferred between states of (i, N) from (or to) states of the form (j, N¯)
as a result of nature changing from N to N¯ or from N¯ to N . Let (γNi )+ = γNi if
γNi > 0 and 0 otherwise; let (γNi )− = γNi if γNi < 0 and 0 otherwise. Intuitively,
(γNi )
+ is the net probability transferred to (i, n) from states of the form (j, N¯) as
a result of nature’s state changing from N¯ to N ; similarly, (γNi )− is the net prob-
ability transferred from (i, N) to states of the form (j, N¯) as a result of nature’s
state changing from N to N¯ . Since
∑N
i=0 q
N
i = 1/2, it is easy to check that∑n
i=0 γ
N
i = 0;
−pi/2 ≤∑ni=0(γNi )− ≤ 0 ≤∑ni=0(γNi )+ ≤ pi/2. (4.3)
We can now rewrite the equations in (4.2) using the γNi ’s to get:
qN0 = (1− pexp)qN0 + ρNd qN1 + γN0
qN1 = (1− ρNd − ρNu )qN1 + ρNd qN2 + pexpqN0 + γN1
...
qNi = (1− ρNd − ρNu )qNi + ρNd qNi+1 + ρNu qNi−1 + γNi
...
qNn = (1− ρNd )qNn + ρNu qNn−1 + γNn .
(4.4)
Although γNi is a function, in general, of qNi , qNi ,qNi−1,qN¯i , qN¯i , and qN¯i−1, we can
solve (4.4) by treating it as a constants, subject to the constraints in (4.3). This
allows us to break the dependency between the equations for qB0 , . . . , qBn and
those for qG0 , . . . , qGn , and solve them separately. This makes the solution much
simpler.
By rearranging the arguments, we can express qNn as a function of only qNn−1,
ρNu , ρNd , and γ
N
n . By then substituting this expression (where the only unknown
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is qNn−1) for qNn in the equation for qNn−1 and rearranging the arguments, we can
express qNn−1 in terms of qNn−2 (and the constants ρNu , ρNd , γ
N
n , and γNn−1). In general,
we can compute qNi as a function of qNi−1 (and the constants ρNu , ρNd , γ
N
i and γNi−1).
Doing this, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n we get
qNi =
1
ρNd
(ρNu q
N
i−1 + (γ
N
n + · · ·+ γNi ); (4.5)
for q1 we get
qN1 =
1
ρNd
(pexpq
N
0 + (γ
N
n + . . .+ γ
N
1 ). (4.6)
Note that substituting the expression for qN1 into the expression for qN0 in (4.4)
gives qN0 = qN0 , since
∑n
i=0 γ
N
i = 0.
We can now sum these equations to get
n∑
i=1
qNi =
1
ρNd
((
n∑
i=1
iγNi (+ρ
N
u
n−1∑
i=1
qNi + (pexpq
N
0 )).
Since
∑n
i=0 q
N
i = 1/2, it follows that
(1/2− qN0 ) = 1ρNd
∑n
i=1 iγ
N
i + ρ
N
u (1/2− qN0 − qNn )
+(pexpq
N
0 )).
(4.7)
Using the equations in (4.4, we can compute qNi as a function of qN0 . We get
qNn =
(ρNu )
n−1
(ρNd )
n
pexpq
N
0 + (
n∑
i=1
γi)
i∑
j=1
(ρNu )
n−j
(ρNd )
n−j+1 .
Plugging this back into (4.7) and rearranging the arguments gives us the follow-
ing equation for qN0 :
(1 + pexp((σN )
n−1)
ρNu −ρNd
)qN0 =
1/2 +
∑n
i=1 γ
N
i
i−∑ij=1((σN )n−j+1
ρNu −ρNd
.
(4.8)
Moreover, all the terms that are multiplied by γi in (4.8) are negative, and, of
these, the one multiplied by γn is the largest in absolute value. Given the con-
straints on (γNi )+ and (γNi )− in (4.3), this means that we get a lower bound on
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qN0 by setting γNn = pi/2, γN0 = −pi/2, and γNi = 0 for i 6= 0, n. This is quite
intuitive: In order to make qN0 as small as possible, we want all of the transitions
from N to N¯ to happen when the automaton is in state 0, and all the transitions
from N¯ to N to happen when the automaton is in state n, since this guarantees
that the expected amount of time that the automaton spends in a state i > 0 is
maximized. Similarly, to make qN0 as large as possible, we should set γN0 = pi/2,
γNn = −pi/2, and γNi = 0 for i 6= 0, N .
Making these choices and doing some algebra, we get that
qN0 ≥ 12(
(ρNu −ρNd )−pi(
∑n
i=1 σ
i
N−n)
(ρNu −ρNd )+pexp((σiN )n−1)
)
qN0 ≤ 12(
(ρNu −ρNd )+pi(
∑n
i=1 σ
i
N−n)
(ρNu −ρNd )+pexp((σiN )n−1)
).
As we have observed before, Epi[A[n, pexp ,Pos ,Neg , ru, rd]] = (1/2− qG0 )xG +
(1/2 − qB0 )xB. Plugging in the upper bound for qG0 and the lower bound for qB0
gives us the required estimate for Proposition 4.3.3, and completes the proof.
4.4 Experimental Results
In the first part of this section, we examine the performance of
A[n, pexp ,Pos ,Neg , ru, rd] with n finite. Using our theoretical analysis, we
come up with an estimate of the performance of the automaton, and show that
our theoretical estimate is very close to what we observe in simulation. In the
second part of the section, we show that the ideas underlying our automaton
can be generalized in a natural way to a setting where nature has more than
two possible states.
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4.4.1 Two states of nature
We focus mostly on scenarios where pi = 0.001, as when nature changes too of-
ten, learning from the signals is meaningless (although even for a larger value
of pi, with a strong enough signal, we can get quite close to the optimal payoff;
with smaller pi the problem is easier). For simplicity, we also consider an ex-
ample where |xB| = |xG| (we used xG = 1, xB = −1, but the results would be
identical for any other choice of values). We discuss below how this assumption
influences the results.
Again, for definiteness, we assume that there are four signals, 1, . . . , 4, which
have probabilities 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, and 0.1, respectively, when the state of nature is
G, and probabilities 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4, respectively, when the state of nature
is bad. We choose signal 1 to be the “good” signal (i.e., we take Pos = {1}),
and take signal 4 to be the “bad” signal (i.e., we take Neg = {4}), and take ru =
rd = 1. We ran the process for 108 rounds (although the variance was already
quite small after 106 rounds, and we got good payoff even with 105, which is
approximately 100 switches between states), using a range of pexp values, and
took the result of the best one. We call this poptexp(n) . As can be seen in Figure 4.2,
the automaton A[n, poptexp(n), {1}, {4}, 1, 1] does well even for small values of n.
The optimal expected payoff for an agent that knows nature’s state is 0.5. With
4 states, the automaton already gets an expected payoff of more than 0.4; even
with 2 states, it gets an expected payoff of more than 0.15.
We also compared the simulation results to the lower bound given by Propo-
sition 4.3.3 (the “est” line in Figure 4.2). As can be seen, the lower bound gives
an excellent estimate of the true results. This is actually quite intuitive. The
worst-case analysis assumes that all transitions from B to G happen when the
43
Figure 4.2: Average payoff as a function of the number of states
automaton is in state 0, and all transitions from G to B happen when the au-
tomaton is in state n. But when nature is in state B, a “good” automaton should
spend most of its time in state 0; similarly, when nature is in state G, a “good”
automaton should spend most of its time in state n (as a result of getting good
signals). Thus, the assumptions of the worst-case analysis are not far from what
we would expect of a good automaton.
Equation (4.1) suggests that while nature is in stateG, as the number of states
grow, the loss term (that is, the minus term in the xG/2 factor) decreases rapidly.
The exact rate of decrease depends on σG. We can think of σG as describing the
quality of the signals that the automaton pays attention to (those in Pos and
Neg) when nature is in state G. From equation (4.1), we see that as the number
of states grows this loss reduces to piσG
pexp(σG−1) . So the agent’s optimal choice is to
set the parameters of the automaton so that the ratio is as large as possible. This
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allows him to both decrease the loss as fast as possible (with regards to number
of states he needs) and to get to the minimal loss possible.
There is of course a tradeoff between σG and σB. The loss while nature is in
state B also decreases rapidly with the number of states, and the rate is depen-
dent on 1/σB. As the number of states grows this loss reduces to
pexp+pi(
σB
1−σB −n)
pexp+ρBd −ρBu
.
The graph also shows that, somewhat surprisingly, having too many states
can hurt, if we fix Pos , Neg , ru, and rd. The lower bound in (4.1) actually bears
this out. The reason that more states might hurt is that, after a long stretch
of time with nature being in state G, the automaton will be in state n. Then
if nature switches to state B, it will take the automaton a long time to get to
state 0. All this time, it will get a payoff of −1. (Of course, if we allowed the
automaton a wider range of strategies, including not using some states, then
having more states can never hurt. But we are considering only automata of
the form A[n, pexp ,Pos ,Neg , ru, rd].) In a sense, this can be viewed as an explana-
tion of the recency bias observed in real decision makers—the tendency to place
significantly more weight on recent observations. While the recency bias has
often been viewed as inappropriate, these experiments can show that it can be
helpful. With more states, more can be remembered, and it becomes harder
to “convince” the automaton to change its mind when nature’s state actually
changes. Having less memory, and thus being more easily influenced by the
last few signals, may be more adaptive. By way of contrast, in Wilson’s [69]
model, nature is static. The optimal automaton in Wilson’s setting displayed a
strong first-impression bias: early observations were extremely influential in the
final outcome, rather than recent observations.
We can do a little better by decreasing ru, thus increasing the amount of time
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it will take the automaton to get to state n when nature is in state G. While this
helps a little, the effect is not great. Moreover, we do not think it is reasonable to
expect resource-bounded agents to “fine-tune” the value of parameters depend-
ing on how many states they are willing to devote to a problem. Fortunately, as
our experimental results show, they do not need to do such fine-tuning for a
wide range of environment settings. There is another tradeoff when choosing
the value of pexp , which lies at the heart of the exploration-exploitation dilemma.
Clearly, if the automaton is in state 0 and nature is in state G, the automaton
wants to explore (i.e., move to state 1 and play R) so as to learn that nature is
in state G. There are two reasons that the automaton could be in state 0 while
nature is in state G. The first is that the automaton gets a sequence of “bad”
signals when nature is in state G that force it to state 0. Clearly this is less likely
to happen the more states the automaton has. The second is that nature may
have switched from B to G while the automaton was in state 0.
Since nature switches from B to G with probability pi, a first cut at the ex-
ploration probability might be pi. However, this first cut is too low an estimate
for two reasons. First, the fewer states an automaton has, the more sensitive it
is to “bad” signals. Thus, the fewer states an automaton has, the more it should
explore. Second, the cost of exploring while nature is in state B is small in com-
parison to the gain of exploring and discovering out nature has switched to state
G. Again, this suggests an increase in the exploration probability. Indeed, we
observe that as pi gets smaller the optimal pexp value gets smaller, but not in the
same ratio. The optimal agent explores less, but still chooses pexp higher than pi.
For example, with n = 6, when changing pi from 0.001 to 0.0001 the optimal pexp
only changed to from 0.03 to 0.008.
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In our simulation, we chose the optimal value of pexp relative to the number
of states; this value did not change significantly as a function of the number
of states or of the signal profiles. For example, taking pexp = 0.03 resulted in
payoffs very similar to those with the optimal value of pexp for all n ≥ 5, and for
a wide range of signal profiles while fixing n to 6. This robustness supports our
contention that agents do not typically need to fine tune parameter values.
4.4.2 More states of nature
We now consider a setting where nature can have more than two states. Specifi-
cally, we allow nature to have t+ 1 states, which we denote B,G1, G2, . . . , Gt. In
each state, there is probability of pi of transitioning to any other state. Again, we
have k signals, and the probability of observing signal i is state dependent. The
agent has t + 1 available actions {S,E1, E2, . . . , Et}. As before, S is the “safe”
action; playing S gives the agent a payoff 0, but also results in the agent receiv-
ing no signal. Playing Ei if the state of nature is B result in a payoff of xB < 0;
playing Ei when the state of nature is Gi gives the agent a payoff of xG > 0;
playing Ei when the state of nature is Gj for i 6= j gives a payoff of 0.
We generalize the family of automata we considered earlier as follows. The
family we consider now consists of product automata, with states of the form
(s0, s1, . . . , st). Each si takes on an integer value from 0 to some maximum n.
Intuitively, the s0 component keeps track of whether nature is in state B or in
some state other than B; the si component keeps track of how likely the state is
to be Gi. If s0 = 0, then the automaton plays safe, as before. Again, if s0 = 0,
then with probability pexp the automaton explores and changes s0 to 1. If s1 > 0,
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then the automaton plays the action corresponding to the state of nature Gi for
which si is greatest (with some tie-breaking rule).
We did experiments using one instance of this setting, where nature was in
one of five possible states—4 good states and one bad state—and there were
six possible signals. We assumed that there was a signal pi that was “good”
for state Gi: it occurred with probability .6 when the state of nature was Gi;
in state Gj with j 6= i, pi occurred with probability 0.08; similarly, there was a
signal that was highly correlated with state B. We considered an automaton for
the agent where each of component of the product had five states (so that there
were 55 = 3125 states in the automaton. In this setting, the optimal payoff is 0.8.
The automaton performed quite well: it was able to get a payoff of 0.7 for an
appropriate setting of its parameters.
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Part III
Models for computationally
bounded agents
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CHAPTER 5
THE TRUTH BEHIND THE MYTH OF THE FOLK THEOREM
5.1 Introduction
The complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium (NE) is a fundamental question
at the interface of game theory and computer science. A celebrated sequence
of results showed that the complexity of finding a NE in a normal-form game
is PPAD-complete [11, 12], even for 2-player games. Less restrictive concepts,
such as -NE for an inverse-polynomial , are just as hard [10]. This suggests
that these problems are computationally intractable.
There was some hope that the situation would be better in infinitely-
repeated games. The Folk Theorem (see [56] for a review) informally states that
in an infinitely-repeated game G, for any payoff profile that is individually ratio-
nal, in that all players get more than1 their minimax payoff (the highest payoff
that a player can guarantee himself, no matter what the other players do) and
is the outcome of some correlated strategy in G, there is a Nash equilibrium of
G with this payoff profile. With such a large set of equilibria, the hope was that
finding one would be less difficult. Indeed, Littman and Stone [50] showed that
these ideas can be used to design an algorithm for finding a NE in a two-player
repeated game.
Borgs et al. [8] (BC+ from now on) proved some results suggesting that,
for more than two players, even in infinitely-repeated games it would be diffi-
cult to find a NE. Specifically, they showed that, under certain assumptions, the
1For our results, since we consider -NE, we can replace “more than” by “at least”.
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problem of finding a NE (or even an -NE for an inverse-polynomial ) in an
infinitely repeated game with three or more players where there is a discount
factor bounded away from 1 by an inverse polynomial is also PPAD-hard. They
prove this by showing that, given an arbitrary normal-form game G with c ≥ 2
players, there is a game G′ with c + 1 players such that finding an /8c-NE for
the repeated game based on G′ is equivalent to finding an -NE for G.
While their proof is indeed correct, we challenge their conclusion. If we take
seriously the importance of being able to find an -NE efficiently, it is partly
because we have computationally bounded players in mind. But then it seems
reasonable to see what happens if we assume that the players in the game are
themselves computationally bounded. Like BC+, we assume that players are re-
source bounded.2 Formally, we view players as probabilistic3 polynomial-time
Turing machines (PPT TMs). We differ from BC+ in two key respects. First, since
we restrict to (probabilistic) polynomial-time players, we restrict the deviations
that can be made in equilibrium to those that can be computed by such play-
ers; BC+ allow arbitrary deviations. Second, BC+ implicitly assume that players
have no memory: they cannot remember computation from earlier rounds. By
way of contrast, we allow players to have a bounded (polynomial) amount of
memory. This allows players to remember the results of a few coin tosses from
earlier rounds, and means that we can use some cryptography (making some
standard cryptographic assumptions) to try to coordinate the players. We stress
that this coordination happens in the process of the game play, not through
2Although BC+ do not discuss modeling players in this way, the problem they show is NP-
Hard is to find a polynomial-time TM profile that implements an equilibrium. There is an ob-
vious exponential-time TM profile that implements an equilibrium: each TM in the profile just
computes the single-shot NE and plays its part repeatedly.
3BC+ describe their TMs as deterministic, but allow them to output a mixed strategy. As they
point out, there is no difference between this formulation and a probabilistic TM that outputs a
specific action; their results hold for such probabilistic TMs as well.
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communication. That is, there are no side channels; the only form of “commu-
nication” is by making moves in the game. We call such TMs stateful, and the
BC+ TMs stateless. We note, that without the restriction on deviations, there is
no real difference between stateful TMs and stateless TMs in our setting (since a
player with unbounded computational power can recreate the necessary state).
With these assumptions (and the remaining assumptions of the BC+ model),
we show that in fact an -NE in an infinitely-repeated game can be found in
polynomial time.
Our equilibrium strategy uses threats and punishment much in the same
way that they are used in the Folk Theorem. However, since the players are
computationally bounded we can use cryptography (we assume the existence
of a secure public key encryption scheme) to secretly correlate the punishing
players. This allows us to overcome the difficulties raised by BC+. Roughly
speaking, the -NE can be described as proceeding in three stages. In the first
stage, the players play a sequence of predefined actions repeatedly. If some
player deviates from the sequence, the second stage begins, in which the other
players use their actions to secretly exchange a random seed, through the use of
public-key encryption. In the third stage, the players use a correlated minimax
strategy to punish the deviator forever. To achieve this correlation, the players
use the secret random seed as the seed of a pseudorandom function, and use
the outputs of the pseudorandom function as the source of randomness for the
correlated strategy. Since the existence of public-key encryption implies the ex-
istence of pseudorandom functions, the only cryptographic assumption needed
is the existence of public-key encryptions—one of the most basic cryptographic
hardness assumptions.
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In the second part of this section we show how to extend this result to a
more refined solution concept. While NE has some attractive features, it allows
some unreasonable solutions. In particular, the equilibrium might be obtained
by what are arguably empty threats. This actually happens in our proposed NE
(and in the basic version of the folk theorem). Specifically, players are required
to punish a deviating player, even though that might hurt their payoff. Thus,
if a deviation occurs, it might not be the best response of the players to follow
their strategy and punish; thus, such a punishment is actually an empty threat.
To deal with this (well known) problem, a number of refinements of NE have
been considered. The one typically used in dynamic games of perfect informa-
tion is subgame-perfect equilibrium, suggested by Selten [63]. A strategy profile
is a subgame-perfect equilibrium if it is a NE at every subgame of the original
game. Informally, this means that at any history of the game (even those that are
not on any equilibrium path), if all the players follow their strategy from that
point on, then no player has an incentive to deviate. In the context of repeated
games where players’ moves are observed (so that it is a game of perfect infor-
mation), the folk theorem continues to hold even if the solution concept used is
subgame-perfect equilibrium [2, 18, 60].
We define a computational analogue of subgame-perfect equilibrium that
we call computational subgame-perfect -equilibrium, where the strategies in-
volved are polynomial-time, and deviating players are again restricted to using
polynomial-time strategies. There are a number of subtleties that arise in defin-
ing this notion. While we assume that all actions in the underlying repeated
game are observable, we allow our TMs to also have memory, which means
the action of a TM does not depend only on the public history. Like subgame-
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perfect equilibrium, our computational solution concept is intended to capture
the intuition that the strategies are in equilibrium after any possible deviation.
This means that in a computational subgame-perfect equilibrium, at each his-
tory for player i, player i must make a (possibly approximate) best response, no
matter what his and the other players’ memory states are.
To compute a computational subgame-perfect -equilibrium, we use the
same basic strategy as for NE, but, as often done to get a subgame-perfect equi-
librium (for example see [18]), we limit the punishment phase length, so that the
players are not incentivized not to punish deviations. However, to prove our
result, we need to overcome one more significant hurdle. When using crypto-
graphic protocols, it is often the case (and, specifically is the case in the protocol
used for NE) that player i chooses a secret (e.g., a secret key for a public-key en-
cryption scheme) as the result of some randomization, and then releases some
public information which is a function of the secret (e.g., a public key). Af-
ter that public information has been released, another party j typically has a
profitable deviation by switching to the TM M that can break the protocol—for
every valid public information, there always exists some TM M that has the se-
cret “hardwired” into it (although there may not be an efficient way of finding
M given the information). We deal with this problem by doing what is often
done in practice: we do not use any key for too long, so that j cannot gain too
much by knowing any one key.
A second challenge we face is that in order to prove that our new proposed
strategies are even an -NE, we need to show that the payoff of the best response
to this strategy is not much greater than that of playing the strategy. However,
since for any polynomial-time TM there is always a better polynomial-time TM
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that has just a slightly longer running time, this natural approach fails. This in-
stead leads us to characterize a class of TMs we can analyze, and show that any
other TM can be converted to a TM in this class that has at least the same payoff.
While such an argument might seem simple in the traditional setting, since we
only allow for polynomial time TMs, in our setting this turns out to require a
surprisingly delicate construction and analysis to make sure this converted TM
does indeed has the correct size and running time.
The idea of using the structure of the game as a means of correlation is used
by Lehrer [49] to show an equivalence between NE and correlated equilibrium
in certain repeated games with nonstandard information structures. The use of
cryptography in game theory goes back to Urbano and Vila [66, 67], who also
used it to achieve coordination between players. More recently, it has been used
by, for example, Dodis, Halevi, and Rabin [14].
The application of cryptography perhaps most closely related to ours is by
Gossner [24], who uses cryptographic techniques to show how any payoff pro-
file that is above the players’ correlated minimax value can be achieved in a
NE of a repeated game with public communication played by computationally
bounded players. In [25], a strategy similar to the one that we use is used to
prove that, even without communication, the same result holds. Gossner’s re-
sults apply only to infinitely-repeated games with 3 players and no discounting;
he claims that his results do not hold for games with discounting. Gossner does
not discuss the complexity of finding a strategy of the type that he shows exists.
Recently, Andersen and Conitzer [1] described an algorithm for finding NE
in repeated games with more than two players with high probability in uniform
games. However, this algorithm is not guaranteed to work for all games, and
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uses the limit of means as its payoff criterion, and not discounting.
There are a few recent papers that investigate solution concepts for
extensive-form games involving computationally bounded player [47, 26, 28];
some of these focus on cryptographic protocols [47, 26]. Kol and Naor [47] dis-
cuss refinements of NE in the context of cryptographic protocols, but their so-
lution concept requires only that on each history on the equilibrium path, the
strategies from that point on form a NE. Our requirement for the computational
subgame-perfect equilibrium is much stronger. Gradwohl, Livne and Rosen [26]
also consider this scenario and offer a solution concept different from ours; they
try to define when an empty threat occurs, and look for strategy profiles where
no empty threats are made. Again, our solution concept is much stronger.
5.2 Preliminaries
5.2.1 Infinitely repeated games
Given a normal-form game G4, we define the repeated game Gt(δ) as the game
in whichG is played repeatedly t times (in this context,G is called the stage game)
and 1− δ is the discount factor (see below). Let G∞(δ) be the game where G is
played infinitely many times. An infinite history h in this game is an infinite
sequence 〈~a0,~a1, . . .〉 of action profiles. Intuitively, we can think of ~at as the
action profile played in the tth stage game. We often omit the δ in G∞(δ) if it is
not relevant to the discussion. Let HG∞ be the set of all possible histories of G∞.
4To simplify the presentation, we assume all the payoffs in G are normalized so that each
player’s minimax value is 0. Since, in an equilibrium, all players get at least their minimax
value, this guarantees that all players get at least 0 in a correlated equilibrium.
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For a history h ∈ HG∞ let G∞(h) be the subgame that starts at history h (after |h|
one-shot games have been played where all players played according to h). We
assume that G∞ is fully observable, in the sense that, after each stage game, the
players observe exactly what actions the other players played.
A (behavioral) strategy for player i in a repeated game is a function σ from
histories of the games to ∆(Ai). Note that a profile ~σ induces a distribution ρ~σ
on infinite histories of play. Let ρt~σ denote the induced distribution on H
t, the
set of histories of length t. (If t = 0, we take H0 to consist of the unique history
of length 0, namely 〈 〉.) Player i’s utility if ~σ is played, denoted pi(~σ), is defined
as follows:
pi(~σ) = δ
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)t
∑
h∈Ht,~a∈A
ρt+1~σ (h · ~a)[ui(~a)].
Thus, the discount factor is 1−δ. Note that the initial δ is a normalization factor.
It guarantees that if ui(~a) ∈ [b1, b2] for all joint actions ~a in G, then i’s utility is in
[b1, b2], no matter which strategy profile ~σ is played.
In these game, a more robust solution concept is subgame-perfect equilib-
rium [63], which requires that the strategies form an -NE at every history of the
game.
Definition 5.2.1 A strategy profile ~σ = (σ1, ..., σc), is a subgame-perfect -equilibrium
of a repeated game G∞, if, for all players i ∈ [c], all histories h ∈ HG∞ where player i
moves, and all strategies σ′ for player i,
phi ((σ
′)h, ~σh−i) ≤ phi (~σh) + ,
where phi is the utility function for player i in game G∞(h), and σh is the restriction of
σ to G∞(h).
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5.2.2 Cryptographic definitions
For a probabilistic algorithm A and an infinite bit string r, A(x; r) denotes the
output of A running on input x with randomness r; A(x) denotes the distri-
bution on outputs of A induced by considering A(x; r), where r is chosen uni-
formly at random. A function  : N → [0, 1] is negligible if, for every constant
c ∈ N, (k) < k−c for sufficiently large k.
We use a non-uniform security model, which means our attackers are non-
uniform PPT algorithm.
Definition 5.2.2 A non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine A is a se-
quence of probabilistic machines A = {A1, A2, ...} for which there exists a polynomial d
such that both |An|, the description size of An (i.e., the states and transitions in An),
and the running time of An are less than d(i).
Alternatively, a non-uniform PPT machine can also be defined as a uniform
PPT machine that receives an advice string (for example, on an extra “advice”
tape) for each input length. It is common to assume that the cryptographic
building blocks we define next and use in our constructions are secure against
non-uniform PPT algorithms.
Computational Indistinguishability
Definition 5.2.3 A probability ensemble is a sequence X = {Xn}n∈N of probability
distribution indexed by N. (Typically, in an ensemble X = {Xn}n∈N, the support of Xn
consists of strings of length n.)
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We now recall the definition of computational indistinguishability [22].
Definition 5.2.4 Two probability ensembles {Xn}n∈N, {Yn}n∈N are (non-uniformly)
computationally indistinguishable if, for all (non-uniform) PPT TMsD, there exists
a negligible function  such that, for all n ∈ N,
|Pr[D(1n, Xn) = 1]− Pr[D(1n, Yn) = 1]| ≤ (n).
To explain the Pr in the last line, recall that Xn and Yn are probability distributions.
Although we writeD(1n, Xn),D is a randomized algorithm, so whatD(1n, Xn) returns
depends on the outcome of random coin tosses. To be a little more formal, we should
write D(1n, Xn, r), where r is an infinitely long random bit string (of which D will
only use a finite initial prefix). More formally, taking PrXn to be the joint distribution
over strings (x, r) where x is chosen according to Xn and r is chosen according to the
uniform distribution on bit-strings, we want
|PrXn [{(x, r) : D(1n, x, r) = 1}]− PrYn [{(y, r) : D(1n, y, r) = 1}] | ≤ (n).
We similarly abuse notation elsewhere in writing Pr.
We often call a TM that is supposed to distinguish between two probability
ensembles a distinguisher. For the rest of this section when we say computation-
ally indistinguishable we mean the non-uniform version.
Pseudorandom Functions
Definition 5.2.5 A function ensemble is a sequence F = {Fn}n∈N of probability
distributions such that the support of Fn is a set of functions mapping n-bit strings to
n-bit strings. The uniform function ensemble, denoted H = {Hn}n∈N, has Hn be the
uniform distribution over the set of all functions mapping n-bit strings to n-bit strings.
59
We have the same notion of computational indistinguishability for function
ensembles as we had for probability ensembles, only that the distinguisher is
now an oracle machine, meaning that it can query the value of the function at
any point with one computation step, although it does not have the full descrip-
tion of the function. (See [20] for a detailed description.)
We now define pseudorandom functions (see [21]). Intuitively, this is a family
of functions indexed by a seed, such that it is hard to distinguish a random
member of the family from a truly randomly selected function.
Definition 5.2.6 A pseudorandom function ensemble (PRF) is a set
{fs : {0, 1}|s| → {0, 1}|s|}s∈{0,1}∗ such that the following conditions hold:
• (easy to compute) fs(x) can be computed by a PPT algorithm that is given s and
x;
• (pseudorandom) the function ensemble F = {Fn}n∈N, where Fn is uniformly dis-
tributed over the multiset {fs}s∈{0,1}n , is computationally indistinguishable from
H .
We use the standard cryptographic assumption that a family of PRFs exists;
this assumption is implied by the existence of one-way functions [35, 21]. We
actually require the use of a seemingly stronger notion of a PRF, which requires
that an attacker getting access to polynomially many instances of a PRF (i.e., fs
for polynomially many values of s) still cannot distinguish them from polyno-
mially many truly random functions. Nevertheless, as we show next, it follows
using a standard “hybrid” argument that any PRF satisfies also this stronger
“multi-instance” security notion.
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Lemma 5.2.7 For all polynomials q, if {fs : {0, 1}|s| → {0, 1}|s|}s∈{0,1}∗ is a pseudo-
random function ensemble, then the ensemble F q = {F 1n , . . . , F q(n)n }n∈N where, for all
i, F in is uniformly distributed over the multiset {fs}s∈{0,1}n , is computationally indis-
tinguishable from Hq = {H1n, . . . , Hq(n)n }n∈N.
Proof: Assume for contradiction that the ensembles are distinguishable. This
means there exist a polynomial q, a PPT D, and a polynomial p such that for
infinitely many n’s
|Pr[D(1n, (H1n, . . . , Hq(n)n )) = 1]− Pr[D(1n, (F 1n , . . . , F q(n)n )) = 1]| >
1
p(n)
.
For each n, let T in = (1n, (H1n, . . . , H i−1n , F in, . . . , F
q(n)
n )). We can now de-
scribe a PPT D′ that distinguishes {Fn}n∈N and {Hn}n∈N for infinitely many
n’s. First notice that a PPT can easily simulate polynomially many oracle
queries to both a truly random function and to a member of Fn. So D′ on
input (1n, X) randomly chooses j ∈ {1, . . . , q(n)} and calls D with input
(1n, (I1, . . . , Ij−1, X, J j+1, . . . , Jq(n))), where it simulates a query to Ik as a query
to a random member of Hn, and a query to Jk as a query to a random member
of Fn. (Notice that since D is a PPT, it can make only polynomially many oracle
queries to any of the functions, which can be easily simulated). Whenever D
makes an oracle query to X , D′ makes an oracle query to X , and uses its answer
as the answer to D. When D terminates, D′ outputs the same value as D.
Now notice that if X is Hn, then the input to D is T jn, while if X is Fn, then
the input to D is T j+1n . Thus, Pr[D′(1n, Hn) = 1] =
1
q(n)
∑q(n)
i=1 Pr[D(T
i+1
n ) = 1],
and
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Pr[D′(1n, Fn) = 1] = 1q(n)
∑q(n)
i=1 Pr[D(T
i
n) = 1]. It follows that
|Pr[D′(1n, Hn) = 1]− Pr[D′(1n, Fn) = 1]| = 1
q(n)
|
q(n)∑
i=1
Pr[D(T i+1n ) = 1]− Pr[D(T in) = 1]|
=
1
q(n)
|Pr[D(T q(n)+1n ) = 1]− Pr[D(T 1n) = 1]|
>
1
q(n)p(n)
,
where the last inequality is due to the fact that T q(n)+1n = (1n, (H1n, . . . , H
q(n)
n )) and
T 1n = (1
n, (F 1n , . . . , F
q(n)
n )). But this means that for any such n, D′ can distinguish
F = {Fn}n∈N and H = {Hn}n∈N with non-negligible probability, and thus can
do that for infinitely many n’s. This is a contradiction to the assumption that
{fs : {0, 1}|s| → {0, 1}|s|}s∈{0,1}∗ is a pseudorandom function ensemble.
Public-key Encryption Schemes
We now define public-key encryption schemes. Such a scheme has two keys.
The first is public and used for encrypting messages (using a randomized algo-
rithm). The second is secret and used for decrypting. The keys are generated
in such a way that the probability that a decrypted message is equal to the en-
crypted message is equal to 1. The key generation algorithm takes as input a
“security parameter” k that is used to determine the security of the protocols
(intuitively, no polynomial-time attacker should be able to “break” the security
of the protocol except possibly with a probability that is a negligible function of
k).
We now recall the formal definitions of public-key encryption schemes [13,
59, 22].
Definition 5.2.8 A public-key encryption scheme is a triple Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec)
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of PPT algorithms where (a) Gen takes a security parameter 1k as input and returns a
(public key, private key) pair; (b) Enc takes a public key pk and a messagem in a message
space {0, 1}k as input and returns a ciphertext Encpk(m); (c) Dec is a deterministic
algorithm that takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext C as input and outputs m′ =
Decsk(C), and (d)
Pr
[∃m ∈ {0, 1}k such that Decsk(Encpk(m)) 6= m] = 0.
We next define a security notion for public-key encryption. Such a security
notion considers an adversary that is characterized by two PPT algorithms, A1
and A2. Intuitively, A1 gets as input a public key that is part of a (public key,
secret key) pair randomly generated by Gen, together with a security param-
eter k. A1 then outputs two messages in {0, 1}k (intuitively, messages it can
distinguish), and some side information that it passes to A2 (intuitively, this is
information that A2 needs, such as the messages chosen). A2 gets as input the
encryption of one of those messages and the side information passed on by A1.
A2 must output which of the two messages m0 and m1 the encrypted message
is the encryption of (where an output of b ∈ {0, 1} indicates that it is mb). Since
A1 and A2 are PPT algorithms, the output of A2 can be viewed as a probability
distribution over {0, 1}. The scheme is secure if the two ensembles (i.e., the one
generated by this process where the encryption of m0 is always given to A2, and
the one where the encryption of m1 is always given to A2) are indistinguishable.
More formally:
Definition 5.2.9 (Public-key security) A public-key encryption scheme Π =
(Gen,Enc,Dec) is secure if, for every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A =
(A1, A2), the ensembles {INDΠ0 (A, k)}k and {INDΠ1 (A, k)}k are computationally in-
distinguishable, where {INDΠb (A, k)}k is the following PPT algorithm:
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INDΠb (A, k) := (pk, sk)← Gen(1k)
(m0,m1, τ)← A1(1k, pk) (m0,m1 ∈ {0, 1}k)
C ← Encpk(mb)
o← A2(C, τ)
Output o.
Intuitively, the ← above functions as an assignment statement, but it is not quite
that, since the various algorithms are actually PPT algorithms, so their output is ran-
domized. Formally, INDΠb (A, k) is a probability distribution, which we can write as
INDΠb (A, k, r1, r2, r3, r4), where we view r1, r2, r3, and r4 as the random bitstrings that
serve as the second arguments of Gen, A1, Encpk, and A2, respectively. Once we add
these arguments (considering, e.g., Gen(1k, r1) and A1(1k, pk, r2) rather than Gen(1k)
and A1(1k, pk)) these algorithms become deterministic, and← can indeed be viewed as
an assignment statement.
We assume a secure public-key encryption scheme exists. We actually re-
quire a seemingly stronger notion of “multi-instance” security, where an at-
tacker gets to see encryptions of multiple messages, each of which is encrypted
using multiple keys.
Definition 5.2.10 A public-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is multi-
message multi-key secure if, for all polynomials f and g, and for every probabilistic
polynomial time adversary A = (A1, A2), the ensembles {IND-MΠ0 (A, k, f, g)}k and
{IND-MΠ1 (A, k, f, g)}k are computationally indistinguishable, where
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IND-MΠb (A, k, f, g) :=
(pk1, sk1)← Gen(1k), . . . (pkg(k), skg(k))← Gen(1k),
(m10, . . . ,m
f(k)
0 ,m
1
1, . . . ,m
f(k)
1 , τ)← A1(1k, pk1, . . . , pkg(k)) (mi0,mi1 ∈ {0, 1}k)
C ← Encpk1(m1b), . . . ,Encpkg(k)(m1b), . . . ,Encpk1(mf(k)b ), . . . ,Encpkg(k)(mf(k)b )
o← A2(C, τ)
Output o
In this definition, there are polynomially many messages being encrypted,
and each message is encrypted a polynomial number of times, using a different
key each time. Other than that, the process is similar to the standard defini-
tion of security. As we show next, any secure encryption scheme is also multi-
message multi-key secure.
Lemma 5.2.11 If (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a secure public key encryption scheme, then it is
also multi-message multi-key secure.
Proof: Assume for contradiction that (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a secure public
key encryption scheme that is not multi-message multi-key secure. Then
there exist polynomials f and g and an adversary A = (A1, A2) such that
{IND-MΠ0 (A, k, f, g)}k and {IND-MΠ1 (A, k, f, g)}k are distinguishable. That
means there exist a PPT D and a polynomial p such that
|Pr[D(1k, {IND-MΠ0 (A, k, f, g)}) = 1]− Pr[D(1k, {IND-MΠ1 (A, k, f, g)}) = 1]| >
1
p(n)
.
Let T pii,j(A, k, f, g) be the following PPT algorithm:
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T pii,j(A, k, f, g) := (pk1, sk1)← Gen(1k), . . . (pkg(k), skg(k))← Gen(1k),
(m10, . . . ,m
f(k)
0 ,m
1
1, . . . ,m
f(k)
1 , τ)← A1(1k, pk1, . . . , pkg(k))
C ← Encpk1(m10), . . . ,Encpkg(k)(m10),
. . . ,Encpk1(m
j
0), . . . ,Encpki−1(m
j
0),Encpki(m
j
1), . . .Encpkg(k)(m
j
1),
. . .Encpk1(m
f(k)
1 ), . . . ,Encpkg(k)(m
f(k)
1 )
o← A2(C, τ)
Output o.
We now define an adversary A′ = (A′1, A′2), and show that
{INDΠ0 (A′, k, f, g)}k and {INDΠ1 (A′, k, f, g)}k are not computationally
indistinguishable. A′1 on input (1k, pk) first chooses i ∈ {1, . . . , g(k)}
uniformly at random. It then generates g(k)− 1 random key pairs
(pk1, sk1), . . . , (pki−1, ski−1), (pki+1, ski+1), . . . , (pkg(k), skg(k)). It then
calls A1 with input (1k, pk1, . . . , pki−1, pk, pki+1, . . . , pkg(k)). After get-
ting A1’s output M = (m10, . . . ,m
f(k)
0 ,m
1
1, . . . ,m
f(k)
1 , τ), A′1 chooses
j ∈ {1, . . . , f(n)} uniformly at random, and returns as its output
(mj0,m
j
1, (i, j, pk, pk1, sk1, . . . , pkg(k), skg(k),M)).
A′2 on input (C, (i, j, pk, pk1, sk1, . . . , pkg(k), skg(k),M)) constructs input C ′ for
A2 by first appending the encryptions of messagesm10 . . . ,m
j−1
0 with all the keys,
then appending the encryption of mj0 with keys pk1, . . . , pki and then appends
C. It then appends the encryption of mj1 with keys pki+2, . . . , pkg(k) and also
the encryption of the messages mj+11 , . . . ,m
f(k)
1 with each of the keys. It then
outputs A2(C ′, τ). If C is the encryption of m0j with key pk, then this algorithm
is identical to T pii+1,j(A, k, f, g) (if i = g(k) then by T pii+1,j we mean T pi1,j+1; we use
similar conventions elsewhere), while if it is the encryption of m1j with key pk,
then the algorithm is identical to T pii,j(A, k, f, g).
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We claim that D can distinguish {INDΠ0 (A′, k, f, g)}k and
{INDΠ1 (A′, k, f, g)}k. Note that
Pr[D(1k, {INDΠ0 (A′, k, f, g)}) = 1] =
1
g(k)f(k)
f(k)∑
j=1
g(k)∑
i=1
Pr[D(1k, T pii+1,j(A, k, f, g)) = 1]
and
Pr[D(1k, {INDΠ1 (A′, k, f, g)}) = 1] =
1
g(k)f(k)
f(k)∑
j=1
g(k)∑
i=1
Pr[D(1k, T pii,j(A, k, f, g)) = 1].
Thus,
|Pr[D(1k, {INDΠ0 (A′, k, f, g)}) = 1]− Pr[D(1k, {INDΠ1 (A′, k, f, g)}) = 1]|
= 1
g(k)f(k)
|∑f(k)j=1 ∑g(k)i=1 (Pr[D(1k, T pii+1,j(A, k, f, g)) = 1]− Pr[D(1k, T pii,j(A, k, f, g)) = 1])
= 1
g(k)f(k)
|Pr[D(1k, {IND-MΠ0 (A, k, f, g)}) = 1]− Pr[D(1k, {IND-MΠ1 (A, k, f, g)}) = 1]|
> 1
g(k)f(k)p(k)
,
where the next-to-last line follows because T pi1,1(A, k, f, g) = IND-M
Π
1 (A, k, f, g)
and T pig(k)+1,f(k)(A, k, f, g) = IND-M
Π
0 (A, k, f, g). Thus, we have a contradiction
to the fact that the encryption scheme is secure.
5.3 The complexity of finding -NE in repeated games played
by stateful machines
5.3.1 Equilibrium Definition
Since we consider computationally-bounded players, we take a player’s strat-
egy in G∞ to be a (possibly probabilistic) Turing machine (TM), which outputs
at each round an action to be played, based on its internal memory and the his-
tory of play so far. (The TMs considered in BC+ did not have internal memory.)
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We consider only TMs that at round t use polynomial in nt many steps to com-
pute the next action, where n is the maximum number of actions a player has in
G. Thus, n is a measure of the size of G.5 Denote by Mi the TM used by player
i, and let ~M = (M1, . . . ,Mc).
We are now ready to define the notion of equilibrium we use. Intuitively,
as we model players as polynomial-time TMs, we consider a profile of TMs an
equilibrium in a game if there is no player and no other polynomial-time TM
that gives that player a higher expected payoff (or up to an  for an -NE).
Since we consider (probabilistic) TMs that run in polynomial time in the size
of the game, we cannot consider a single game. For any fixed game, running
in polynomial time in the size of the game is meaningless. Instead, we need to
consider a sequence of games. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 5.3.1 An infinite sequence of strategy profiles ~M1, ~M2, . . ., where ~Mk =
(Mk1 , ...,M
k
c ) is an -NE of an infinite sequence of repeated games G∞1 , G∞2 , . . . where
the size of Gk is k if, for all players i ∈ [c] and all non-uniform PPT adversaries M¯
(polynomial in k and t, as discussed above), there exist k0 such that for all k ≥ k0
pki (M¯, ~M
k
−i) ≤ pki ( ~Mk) + (k).
where pki is the payoff of player i in game G∞k .
We note that the equilibrium definition we use considers only deviations that
can be implemented by non-uniform polynomial-time TMs. This is different
from both the usual definition of NE and from the definition used by BC+, who
5When we talk about polynomial-time algorithms, we mean polynomial in n. We could use
other measures of the size of G, such as the total number of actions. Since all reasonable choices
of size are polynomially related, the choice does not affect our results.
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allow arbitrary deviations. But this difference is exactly what allows us to use
cryptographic techniques. The need to define polynomial-time deviation is the
reason for considering sequences of games instead of a single game. There are
other reasonable ways of capturing polynomial-time adversaries. As will be
seen from our proof, our approach is quite robust, so our results should hold
for any reasonable definition.
5.3.2 Computing an equilibrium
In this section we describe the equilibrium strategy and show how to efficiently
compute it. We first start with some definition and lemmas we need for our
proof.
Definition 5.3.2 Let Ga,b,c,n be the set of all games with c players, at most n actions per
player, integral payoffs6, maximum payoff a, and minimum payoff b.
Note that by our assumption that the minimax payoff is 0 for all players, we
can assume a ≥ 0, b ≤ 0, and a − b > 0 (otherwise a = b = 0, which makes
the game uninteresting). We start by showing that, given a correlated strategy
σ in a game G, players can get an average payoff that is arbitrarily close to their
payoff in σ by playing a fixed sequence of action profiles repeatedly.
Lemma 5.3.3 For all a, b, c, all polynomials q, all n, all games G ∈ Ga,b,c,n, and all
correlated strategies σ in G, if the expected payoff vector of playing σ is p then there
6Our result also hold for rational payoffs except then the size of the game needs to take into
account the bits needed to represent the payoffs
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exists a sequence sq of length w(n), where w(n) = ((a−b)q(n)+1)nc, such that player
i’s average payoff in sq is at least pi − 1/q(n).
Proof: Given σ, we create sq the obvious way: by playing each action in
proportion to the probability σ(~a). More precisely, let r = a − b, and define
w(n) = (rq(n) + 1)nc, as in the statement of the lemma. We create a sequence sq
by playing each action profile ~a bw(n)σ(~a)c times, in some fixed order. Notice
that the length of this sequence is between w(n) − nc and w(n). The average
payoff player i gets in sq is
v′i =
1∑
~a∈Abw(n)σ(~a)c
∑
~a∈A
bw(n)σ(~a)cui(~a)
≥ 1∑
~a∈Abw(n)σ(~a)c
 ∑
~a∈A,ui(~a)≥0
(w(n)σ(~a)− 1)ui(~a) +
∑
~a∈A,ui(~a)<0
w(n)σ(~a)ui(~a)

=
w(n)
∑
~a∈A σ(~a)ui(~a)∑
~a∈Abw(n)σ(~a)c
−
∑
~a∈A,ui(~a)≥0 ui(~a)∑
~a∈Abw(n)σ(~a)c
≥ w(n)pi∑
~a∈Abw(n)σ(~a)c
− an
c
w(n)− nc .
If pi < 0,
v′i ≥
w(n)pi∑
~a∈Abw(n)σ(~a)c
− an
c
w(n)− nc ≥
w(n)pi − anc
w(n)− nc
=
(rq(n) + 1)ncpi − anc
(rq(n) + 1)nc − nc =
rq(n)ncpi − (a− pi)nc
rq(n)nc
≥ pi − 1
q(n)
.
If pi ≥ 0,
v′i ≥
w(n)pi∑
~a∈Abw(n)σ(~a)c
− an
c
w(n)− nc ≥ pi −
anc
w(n)− nc
= pi − an
c
(rq(n) + 1)nc − nc = pi −
anc
rq(n)nc
≥ pi − 1
q(n)
.
Lemma 5.3.4 For all a, b, c, all polynomials q and w, all G ∈ Ga,b,c,n, and all sequences
sq of length w(n), if the average payoff vector of playing sq is p, then for all δ ≤ 1/f(n),
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where f(n) = (a−b)w(n)q(n), if sq is played infinitely often, player i’s payoff inG∞(δ)
is at least pi − 1/q(n).
Proof: Suppose that sq = (a0, . . . , aw(n)−1), and let vi be i’s payoff from sq∞ in
G∞(δ). Then
vi = δ
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)tw(n)
w(n)−1∑
k=0
u(ak)(1− δ)k
= pi + δ
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)tw(n)
w(n)−1∑
k=0
(u(ak)− pi)(1− δ)k.
We want to bound the loss from the second part of the sum. Notice that this is
a discounted sum of a sequence whose average payoff is 0. Call this sequence
sq ′. Observe that, because of the discounting, in the worst case, i gets all of his
negative payoff in the first round of sq ′ and all his positive payoffs in the last
round. Thus, we can bound the discounted average payoff by analyzing this
case. Let the sum of i’s negative payoffs in sq ′ be Pneg, which means that the sum
of i’s positive payoffs must be −Pneg. Let r = a− b, let v′i = min~a∈A(ui(~a)− pi) ≥
−r, and let f(n) = rw(n)q(n), as in the statement of the lemma. So, if δ ≤ 1/f(n),
player i′s average discounted payoff in the game is at least
vi ≥ pi + δ
∞∑
t=0
Pneg(1− δ)w(n)t + (−Pneg)(1− δ)w(n)(t+1)−1
= pi + δ(Pneg + (−Pneg)(1− δ)w(n)−1)
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)w(n)t
= pi + δ(Pneg + (−Pneg)(1− δ)w(n)−1) 1
1− (1− δ)w(n)
= pi + Pnegδ
1− (1− δ)w(n)−1
(1− (1− δ)w(n)) ≥ pi + δPneg ≥ pi +
Pneg
f(n)
≥ pi + v
′
iw(n)
f(n)
= pi − 1/q(n).
The next lemma shows that, for every inverse polynomial, if we “cut off”
the game after some appropriately large polynomial p number of rounds (and
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compute the discounted utility for the finitely repeated game considering only
p(n) repetitions), each player’s utility in the finitely repeated game is negligibly
close to his utility in the infinitely repeated game—that is, the finitely repeated
game is a “good” approximation of the infinitely repeated game.
Lemma 5.3.5 For all a, b, c, all polynomials q, all n, all games G ∈ Ga,b,c,n, all 0 < δ <
1, all strategy profiles ~M , and all players i, i’s expected utility pi[ ~M ] in game Gdn/δe(δ)
and pi[ ~M ] in game G∞(δ) differ by at most a/en.
Proof: Let pti( ~M) denote player i’s expected utility if the players are playing ~M
and the game ends at round t. Recall that (1− δ)1/δ ≤ 1/e.
p∞i ( ~M)− pdn/δei ( ~M)
= δ
∑∞
t=0(1− δ)t
∑
h∈Ht,~a∈A ρ
t+1
~M
(h · ~a)[ui(~a)]− δ
∑dn/δe
t=0 (1− δ)t
∑
h∈Ht,~a∈A ρ
t+1
~M
(h · ~a)[ui(~a)]
= δ
∑∞
t=dn/δe+1(1− δ)t
∑
h∈Ht,~a∈A ρ
t+1
~M
(h · ~a)[ui(~a)]
≤ δ∑∞t=dn/δe(1− δ)ta
= δ(1− δ)dn/δe∑∞t=0(1− δ)ta = δ(1− δ)dn/δe aδ ≤ aen .
The -NE strategy and the algorithm
Let A0i ⊂ Ai be a non-empty set and let A1i = Ai \ A0i .7 A player can broadcast
an m-bit string by using his actions for m rounds, by treating actions from A0i
as 0 and actions from A1i as 1. Let (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a multi-message multi-key
secure public-key encryption scheme, such that if the security parameter is k,
the length of the public key is v(k) and the length of an encrypted message is
7We assume that each player has at least two actions in G. This assumption is without loss
of generality—we can essentially ignore players for whom it does not hold.
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z(k) for some polynomials v and z. Let sq = (s1, s2 . . . , sm) be a fixed sequence of
action profiles. Fix a polynomial-time pseudorandom function ensemble {PS s :
s ∈ {0, 1}∗}. For a game G such that |G| = n, consider the strategy σNE for
player i in G∞(δ) that has the following three phases. Phase 1 explains what to
do if no deviation occurs: play sq . Phase 2 gives the preliminaries of what to do
if a deviation does occur: roughly, compute a random seed that is shared with
all the non-deviating players. Phase 3 explains how to use the random seed to
produce a correlated punishment strategy that punishes the deviating player.
Formally let ~MσNE be the TMs that implement the following strategy:
1. Play according to sq (with wraparound) as long as all players played ac-
cording to sq in the previous round.
2. After detecting a deviation by player j 6= i in round t0:8
(a) Generate a pair (pki, ski) using Gen(1n). Store ski in memory and use
the next v(n) rounds to broadcast pki, as discussed above.
(b) If i = j + 1 (with wraparound), player i does the following:
• i records pkj′ for all players j′ /∈ {i, j};
• i generates a random n-bit string seed ;
• for each player j′ /∈ {i, j}, i computes m = Encpkj′ (seed), and
uses the next (c− 2)z(n) rounds to communicate these strings to
the players other than i and j (in some predefined order).
(c) If i 6= j + 1, player i does the following:
• i records the actions played by j + 1 at time slots designated for i
to retrieve EncPki(seed);
8If more than one player deviates while playing sq , the players punish the one with the
smaller index. The punished player plays his best response to what the other players are doing
in this phase.
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• i decrypts to obtain seed , using Dec and ski.
3. Phase 2 ends after v(n) + (c − 2)z(n) rounds. The players other than j
then compute PS seed(t) and use it to determine which action profile to play
according to the distribution defined by a fixed (correlated) punishment
strategy against j.
Note that if the players other than j had played a punishment strategy
against j, then j would get his minimax payoff of 0. What the players other
than j are actually doing is playing an approximation to a punishment strat-
egy in two senses: first they are using a psuedorandom function to generate
the randomness, which means that they are not quite playing according to the
actual punishment strategy. Also, j might be able to guess which pure strategy
profile they are actually playing at each round, and so do better than his mini-
max value. As we now show, j’s expected gain during the punishment phase is
negligible.
Lemma 5.3.6 For all a, b, c, all polynomials t and f , all n, and all games G ∈ Ga,b,c,n,
in G∞(1/f(n)), if the players other than j play ~MσNE−j , then if j deviates at round t(n),
j’s expected payoff during the punishment phase is negligible.
Proof: Since we want to show j’s expected payoff during the punishment
phase (phase (3) only) is negligible, it suffices to consider only polynomially
many rounds of playing phase (3) (more precisely, at most nf(n) rounds); by
Lemma 5.3.5, any payoff beyond then is guaranteed to be negligible due to the
discounting.
We construct three variants of the strategy ~MσNE−j , that vary in phases (2) and
(3). We can think of these variants as interpolating between the strategy above
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and the use of true randomness. (These variants assume an oracle that pro-
vides appropriate information; these variants are used only to make the claims
precise.)
H1 In phase (2), the punishing players send their public keys to j + 1. For each
player j′ not being punished, player j + 1 then encrypts the seed 0 using
(j′)’s public key, and then sends the encrypted key to j′. In phase (3),
the punishing players get the output of a truly random function (from an
oracle), and use it to play the true punishment strategy. (In this case, phase
(2) can be eliminated.)
H2 In phase (2), the punishing players send their public keys to j + 1. For
each player j′ not being punished, player j + 1 encrypts the seed 0 using
(j′)’s public key, and then sends the encrypted key to j′. In phase (3),
the punishing players get a joint random string seed (from an oracle) and
use the outputs of PS seed to decide which strategy profile to play in each
round. (Again, in this case, phase (2) can be eliminated.)
H3 In phase (2), the punishing players send their public keys to j+1. Player j+1
chooses a random string seed and, for each player j′ not being punished,
j + 1 encrypts seed using (j′)’s public key, and then sends the encrypted
key to j′. In phase (3), the punishing players use the outputs of PS seed to
decide which strategy profile to play in each round.
It is obvious that in H1, j’s expected payoff is negligible. (Actually, there
is a slight subtlety here. As we observed above, using linear programming,
we can compute a strategy that gives the correlated minimax, which gives j
an expected payoff of 0. To actually implement this correlated minimax, the
players need to sample according to the minimax distribution. They cannot
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necessarily do this exactly (for example, 1/3 can’t be computed exactly using
random bits). However, given n, the distribution can be discretized to the closest
rational number of the form m/2n using at most n random bits. Using such a
discretized distribution, the players other than j can ensure that j gets only a
negligible payoff.)
We now claim that in H2, j’s expected payoff during the punishment phase
is negligible. Assume for contradiction that a player playing H2 has a non-
negligible payoff µ(n) for all n (i.e., there exists some polynomial g(·) such that
µ(n) ≥ 1/g(n) for infinitely many n.). Let h(n) = n(a− b)2(1/µ(n))2. We claim
that if j’s expected payoff is non-negligible, then we can distinguish h(n) in-
stances of the PRF {PSs : s ∈ {0, 1}n} with independently generated random
seeds, from h(n) independent truly random functions, contradicting the multi-
instance security of the PRF PS.
More precisely, we construct a distinguisher D that, given 1n and oracle ac-
cess to a set of functions f 1, f 2, . . . , fh(n), proceeds as follows. It simulates H2
(it gets the description of the machines to play as its non-uniform advice) h(n)
times where in iteration i′, it uses the function f i′ as the randomization source
of the correlated punishment strategy. D then computes the average payoff of
player j in the h(n) runs, and outputs 1 if this average exceeds µ(n)/2. Note that
if the functions f 1, f 2, . . . , fh(n) are truly independent random functions, then
D perfectly simulates H1 and thus, in each iteration i′, the expected payoff of
player j (during the punishment phase) is negligible. On the other hand, if the
functions f 1, f 2, . . . , fh(n) are h(n) independent randomly chosen instances of
the PRF {PSs : s ∈ {0, 1}n}, then D perfectly simulates H2, and thus, in each
iteration i′, the expected payoff of player j (during the punishment phase) is at
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least µ(n).
By Hoeffding’s inequality [38], given m random variables X1, . . . , Xm all of
which take on values in an interval of size c′, p(|X − E(X)| ≥ r) ≤ 2exp(−2mr2
c′2 )
. Since, in this setting, the range of the random variables is an interval of size
a− b, the probability that D outputs 1 when the function are truly independent
is at most 2/en, while the probability that D outputs 1 when the functions are
independent randomly chosen instances of the PRF {PSs : s ∈ {0, 1}n} is at least
1− 2/en. This, in turn, means that the difference between them is not negligible,
which is a contradiction. Thus, j’s expected payoff in H2 must be negligible.
We now claim that in H3, player j’s expected payoff during the punishment
phase is also negligible. Indeed, if j can get a non-negligible payoff, then we
can break the multi-message multi-key secure encryption scheme.
Again, assume for contradiction that the punished player’s expected pay-
off in the punishment phase is a non-negligible function µ(n) for all n. We can
build a distinguisher A = (A1, A2) (which also gets the description of the ma-
chines to play as its non-uniform advice) to distinguish {IND-MΠ0 (A, n, h, c)}n
and {IND-MΠ1 (A, n, h, c)}n (where we abuse notation and identify c with the
constant polynomial that always returns c). Given n, A1 randomly selects h(n)
messages r1, . . . , rh(n) and outputs (0, . . . , 0, r1, . . . , rh(n), (pk1, . . . , pkc)). A2 splits
its input into pieces. The first piece contains the first c encryptions in C (i.e., the
c encryptions of the first message chosen, according to the c different encryp-
tion functions), the second the next c encryptions and so on. Notice that each
piece consists of c different encryptions of the same message in both cases. It
can also simulate phase (1) by following the strategy for t rounds. It then uses
each piece, along with the public keys, to simulate the communication in phase
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(2). For piece j it uses rj as the seed of the PRF in phase (3). It repeats this ex-
periment for all the different pieces of the input, for a total of h(n) times, and
outputs 1 if the punished player’s average payoff over all experiments using its
strategy is more than µ(n)/2.
Note that if b = 1, player j faces H3 (i.e., the distributions over runs when
b = 1 is identical to the distribution over runs with H3, since in both cases
the seed is chosen at random and the corresponding messages are selected the
same way), so player j’s expected payoff in the punishment phase is µ(n). Thus,
by Hoeffding’s inequality the probability that player j’s average payoff in the
punishment phase is more then µ(n)/2 is 1 − 2/en, so A2 outputs 1 with that
probability in the case b = 1. On the other hand, if b = 0, then this is just H2. We
know player j’s expected payoff in the punishment phase in each experiment
is no more than negligible in H2, so the probability that the average payoff is
more than µ(n)/2 after h(n) rounds, is negligible. This means that there is a
non-negligible difference between the probability A outputs 1 when b = 1 and
when b = 0, which contradicts the assumption that the encryption scheme is
multi-message multi-key secure public key secure. Thus, the gain in H3 must
be negligible.
H3 is exactly the game that the punished player faces; thus, this shows he
can’t hope to gain more than a negligible payoff in expectation.
We can now state and prove our main theorem, which says that σNE is an
-NE for all inverse polynomials  and can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 5.3.7 For all a, b, c, and all polynomials q, there is a polynomial f and a
polynomial-time algorithm F such that, for all sequences G1, G2, . . . of games with
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Gj ∈ Ga,b,c,j and for all inverse polynomials δ ≤ 1/f , the sequence of outputs of F
given the sequence G1, G2, . . . of inputs is a 1q -NE for G
∞
1 (δ(1)), G
∞
2 (δ(2)), . . ..
Proof: Given a game Gn ∈ G(a, b, c, n), the first step of the algorithm is to find
a correlated equilibrium σ of Gn. This can be done in polynomial time using
linear programming. Since the minimax value of the game is 0 for all players,
all players have an expected utility of at least 0 using σ. Let r = a−b. By Lemma
5.3.3, we can construct a sequence sq of lengthw(n) = (3rnq(n)+1)nc that has an
average payoff for each player that is at most 1/3q(n) less than his payoff using
σ. By Lemma 5.3.4, it follows that by setting the discount factor δ < 1/f ′(n),
where f ′(n) = 3rw(n)q(n), the loss due to discounting is also at most 1/3q(n).
We can also find a punishment strategy against each player in polynomial time,
using linear programming.
We can now compute the strategy ~MσNE described earlier that uses the se-
quence sq and the punishment strategies. Let ~σ∗n be this strategy when given Gn
as input. Let m(n) = v(n) + (c− 2)z(n) (the length of phase (2)). Let
f(n) = max(3q(n)(m(n)a+ 1), f ′(n)).
Notice that f is independent of the actual game as required.
We now show that ~σ∗1, . . . as defined above is a (1/q)-NE. If in game Gn a
player follows σ∗n, he gets at least −2/3q(n). Suppose that player j defects at
round t; that is, that he plays according to σ∗n until round t, and then defects.
By Lemma 5.3.5 if t > n
δ(n)
, then any gain from defection is negligible, so there
exists some n1 such that, for all n > n1, a defection in round t cannot result in
the player gaining more than 1
q(n)
. If player j defects at round t ≤ n
δ(n)
, he gets at
most a for the duration of phase (2), which is at most m(n) rounds, and then, by
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Lemma 5.3.6, gains only a negligible amount, say neg(n) (which may depend
on the sequence of deviations), in phase (3). Let uni be the payoff of player i in
game Gn of the sequence. It suffices to show that
δ(n)(
t∑
k=0
uni (ak)(1− δ(n))k +
m(n)∑
k=0
a(1− δ(n))k+t + (1− δ(n))t+m(n)neg(n))− 1/q(n)
≤ δ(n)(
t∑
k=0
uni (ak)(1− δ(n))k +
∞∑
k=t
uni (ak)(1− δ(n))k).
By deleting the common terms from both side, rearranging, and noticing that
(1− δ(n))m(n)neg(n) ≤ neg(n), it follows that it suffices to show
δ(n)(1− δ(n))t(
m(n)∑
k=0
a(1− δ(n))k + neg(n))− 1
q(n)
≤
δ(n)(1− δ(n))t(
∞∑
k=0
uni (ak+t)(1− δ(n))k).
We divide both sides of the equation by (1 − δ(n))t . No matter at what step
of the sequence the defection happens, the future expected discounted payoff
from that point on is still at least −2/3q(n), as our bound applies for the worst
sequence for a player, and we assumed that in equilibrium all players get at
least 0. It follows that we need to show
δ(n)(
m(n)∑
k=0
a(1− δ(n))k + neg(n))− 1
q(n)(1− δ(n))t ≤ −
2
3q(n)
.
Since neg is negligible for all deviations, it follows that, for all sequences of
deviations, there exists n0 such that neg(n) < 1 for all n ≥ n0. For n ≥ n0,
δ(n)(
∑m(n)
k=0 a(1− δ(n))k + neg(n))− 1q(n)(1−δ(n))t
≤ δ(n)(m(n)a+ neg(n))− 1q(n)
≤ m(n)a+neg(n)
f(n)
− 1
q(n)
≤ m(n)a+neg(n)
3q(n)(m(n)a+1)
− 1
q(n)
≤ 1
3q(n)
− 1
q(n)
= − 2
3q(n)
.
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This shows that there is no deviating strategy that can result in the player gain-
ing more than 1
q(n)
in Gn for n > max{n0, n1}.
5.3.3 Dealing with a variable number of players
Up to now, we have assumed, just as in Borgs et al. [8], that the number of
players in the game is a fixed constant (≥ 3).
What happens if the number of players in the game is part of the input? In
general, describing the players’ utilities in such a game takes space exponential
in the number of players (since there are exponentially many strategy profiles).
Thus, to get interesting computational results, we consider games that can be
represented succinctly.
Graphical games [46] of degree d are games that can be represented by a
graph in which each player is a node in the graph, and the utility of a player
is a function of only his action and the actions of the players to which he is
connected by an edge. The maximum degree of a node is assumed to be at most
d. This means a player’s punishment strategy depends only on the actions of at
most d players.
Definition 5.3.8 Let G ′a,b,d,n,m be the set of all graphical games with degree at most d,
at most m players and at most n actions per player, integral payoffs,9 maximum payoff
a, and minimum payoff b.
The following corollary then follows from the fact that a correlated equilib-
9Again, our result also holds for rational payoffs, except then the size of the game needs to
take into account the bits needed to represent the payoffs.
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rium with polynomial sized-support can be computed in polynomial time [41],
the observation that we can easily compute a correlated minimax strategy that
depends only on the actions of at most d players and our theorem (where in
Lemma 5.3.3 we replace nc in the definition of w(n) with the size of the support
of the correlated equilibrium).
Corollary 5.3.9 For all a, b, d, and all polynomials q, there is a polynomial f and
a polynomial-time algorithm F such that, for all sequences G1, G2, . . . of games with
Gj ∈ Ga,b,d,j,j and for all inverse polynomials δ ≤ 1/f , the sequence of outputs of F
given the sequenceG1, G2, . . . of inputs is a 1q -equilibrium forG
∞
1 (δ(1)), G
∞
2 (δ(2)), . . ..
5.4 Computational subgame-perfect equilibrium
5.4.1 Motivation and Definition
In this section we would like to define a notion similar to subgame-perfect equi-
librium, where for all histories h in the game tree (even ones not on the equi-
librium path), playing ~σ restricted to the subtree starting at h forms a NE. This
means that a player does not have any incentive to deviate, no matter where he
finds himself in the game tree.
As we suggested in the introduction, there are a number of issues that need
to be addressed in formalizing this intuition in our computational setting. First,
since we consider stateful TMs, there is more to a description of a situation than
just the history; we need to know the memory state of the TM. That is, if we
take a history to be just a sequence of actions, then the analogue of history for
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us is really a pair (h, ~m) consisting of a sequence h of actions, and a profile
of memory states, one for each player. Thus, to be a computational subgame-
perfect equilibrium the strategies should be a NE at every history and no matter
what the memory states are.
Another point of view is to say that the players do not in fact have per-
fect information in our setting, since we allow the TMs to have memory that
is not observed by the other players, and thus the game should be understood
as a game of imperfect information. In a given history h where i moves, i’s in-
formation set consists of all situations where the history is h and the states of
memory of the other players are arbitrary. While subgame-perfect equilibrium
extends to imperfect information games it usually doesn’t have much bite (see
[48] for a discussion on this point). For the games that we consider, subgame-
perfect equilibrium typically reduces to NE. An arguably more natural general-
ization of subgame-perfect equilibrium in imperfect-information games would
require that if an information set for player i off the equilibrium path is reached,
then player i’s strategy is a best response to the other players’ strategies no mat-
ter how that information set is reached. This is quite a strong requirement. (see
[56][pp. 219–221] for a discussion of this issue); such equilibria do not in gen-
eral exist in games of imperfect information.
Instead, in games of imperfect information, the solution concept most com-
monly used is sequential equilibrium [48]. A sequential equilibrium is a pair (~σ, µ)
consisting of a strategy profile ~σ and a belief system µ, where µ associates with
each information set I a probability µ(I) on the nodes in I . Intuitively, if I is
an information set for player i, µ(I) describes i’s beliefs about the likelihood of
being in each of the nodes in I . Then (~σ, µ) is a sequential equilibrium if, for
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each player i and each information set I for player i, σi is a best response to ~σ−i
given i’s beliefs µ(I). However, a common criticism of this solution concept is
that it is unclear what these beliefs should be and how players create these be-
liefs. Instead, our notion of computational subgame-perfection can be viewed
as a strong version of a sequential equilibrium, where, for each player i and each
information set I for i, σi is a best response to ~σ−i conditional on reaching I (up
to ) no matter what i’s beliefs are at I .
As a deviating TM can change its memory state in arbitrary ways, when we
argue that a strategy profile is an -NE at a history, we must also consider all
possible states that the TM might start with at that history. Since there exists
a deviation that just rewrites the memory in the round just before the history
we are considering, any memory state (of polynomial length) is possible. Thus,
in the computational setting, we require that the TM’s strategies are an -NE
at every history, no matter what the states of the TMs are at that history. This
solution concept is in the spirit of subgame-perfect equilibrium, as we require
that the strategies are a NE after every possible deviation, although the player
might not have complete information as to what the deviation is.
Intuitively, a profile ~M of TMs is a computational subgame-perfect equilib-
rium if for all players i, all histories h where i moves, and all memory profiles
~m of the players, there is no polynomial-time TM M¯ such that player i can gain
more than  by switching from Mi to M¯ . To make it precise, we must again
consider an infinite sequence of games of increasing size (just as we do for NE,
although this definition is more complicated since we must consider memory
states).
For a memory state m and a TM M let M(m), stand for running M with ini-
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tial memory statem. We use ~M(~m) to denote (M1(m1), . . . ,Mc(mc)). Let p
G,δ
i (
~M)
denote player i’s payoff in G∞(δ) when ~M is played.
Definition 5.4.1 An infinite sequence of strategy profiles ~M1, ~M2, . . ., where
~Mk = (Mk1 , ...,M
k
c ), is a computational subgame-perfect -equilibrium of an infi-
nite sequence of repeated games G∞1 , G∞2 , . . . where the size of Gk is k, if, for all players
i ∈ [c], all sequences h1 ∈ HG∞1 , h2 ∈ HG∞2 , . . . of histories, all sequences ~m1, ~m2, . . .
of polynomial-length memory-state profiles, where ~mk = (mk1, . . . ,mkc ), and all non-
uniform PPT adversaries M¯ , there exists k0 such that, for all k ≥ k0,
p
G∞k (hk),δ
i (M¯(m
k
i ), ~M
k
−i(~m
k
−i)) ≤ pG
∞
k (hk),δ
i (
~Mk(~mk)) + (k).
5.4.2 Computing a subgame-perfect -NE
For a game G such that |G| = n, and a polynomial `, consider the following
strategy σNE ,`, and let ~MσNE,` be the TMs that implement this strategy. This
strategy is similar in spirit to that proposed in Section 5.3.2; indeed, the first two
phases are identical. The key difference is that the punishment phase is played
for only `(n) rounds. After that, players return to phase 1. As we show, this
limited punishment is effective since it is not played long enough to make it
an empty threat (if ` is chosen appropriately). Phase 4 takes care of one minor
issue: The fact that we can start in any memory state means that a player might
be called on to do something that, in fact, he cannot do (because he doesn’t have
the information required to do it). For example, he might be called upon to play
the correlated punishment strategy in a state where he has forgotten the random
seed, so he cannot play it. In this case, a default action is played. Note that his
was not an issue in the analysis of NE.
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1. Play according to sq (with wraparound) as long as all players played ac-
cording to sq in the previous round.
2. After detecting a deviation by player j 6= i in round t0:10
(a) Generate a pair (pki, ski) using Gen(1n). Store ski in memory and use
the next v(n) rounds to broadcast pki.
(b) If i = j + 1 (with wraparound), player i does the following:
• i records pkj′ for all players j′ /∈ {i, j};
• i generates a random n-bit string seed ;
• for each player j′ /∈ {i, j}, i computes m = Encpkj′ (seed), and
uses the next (c− 2)z(n) rounds to communicate these strings to
the players other than i and j (in some predefined order).
(c) If i 6= j + 1, player i does the following:
• i records the actions played by j + 1 at time slots designated for i
to retrieve EncPki(seed);
• i decrypts to obtain seed , using Dec and ski.
3. Phase 2 ends after v(n) + (c− 2)z(n) rounds. The players other than j then
compute PS seed(t) and use it to determine which action profile to play
according to the distribution defined by a fixed (correlated) punishment
strategy against j. Player j plays his best response to the correlated pun-
ishment strategy throughout this phase. After `(n) rounds, they return to
phase 1, playing the sequence sq from the point at which the deviation
occurred (which can easily be inferred from the history).
10Again, if more than one player deviates while playing sq , the players punish the one with
the smaller index. The punished player plays his best response to what the other players are
doing in this phase.
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4. If at any point less than or equal to v(n) + (c − 2)z(n) time steps from the
last deviation from phase 1 the situation is incompatible with phase 2 as
described above (perhaps because further deviations have occurred), or at
any point between v(n)+(c−2)z(n) and v(n)+(c−2)z(n)+`(n) steps since
the last deviation from phase 1 the situation is incompatible with phase 3
as described above, play a fixed action for the number of rounds left to
complete phases 2 and 3 (i.e., up to v(n) + (c− 2)z(n) + `(n) steps from the
last deviation from phase 1). Then return to phase 1.
Note that with this strategy a deviation made during the punishment phase is
not punished. Phase 2 and 3 are always played to their full length (which is
fixed and predefined by ` and z). We say that a history h is a phase 1 history if
it is a history where an honest player should play according to sq . History h is
a phase 2 history if it is a history where at most v(n) + (c − 2)z(n) rounds have
passed since the last deviation from phase 1; h is a phase 3 history if more than
v(n) + (c− 2)z(n) but at most v(n) + (c− 2)z(n) + `(n) rounds have passed since
the last deviation from phase 1. No matter what happens in phase 2 and 3, a
history in which exactly v(n) + (c − 2)z(n) + `(n) round have passed since the
last deviation from phase 1 is also a phase 1 history (even if the players deviate
from phase 2 and 3 in arbitrary ways). Thus, no matter how many deviations
occur, we can uniquely identify the phase of each round.
We next show that by selecting the right parameters, these strategies are easy
to compute and are a subgame-perfect -equilibrium for all inverse polynomials
.
Definition 5.4.2 Let Ga,b,c,n be the set of all games with c players, at most n actions per
player, integral payoffs, maximum payoff a, and minimum payoff b.
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We first show that for any strategy that deviates while phase 1 is played,
there is a strategy whose payoff is at least as good and either does not deviate
in the first polynomially many rounds, or after its first deviation, deviates every
time phase 1 is played. (Recall that after every deviation in phase 1, the other
players play the punishment phase for `(n) rounds and then play phase 1 again.)
We do this by showing that if player i has a profitable deviation at some
round t of phase 1, then it must be the case that every time this round of phase
1 is played, i has a profitable deviation there. (That is, the strategy of deviating
every time this round of phase 1 is played is at least as good as a strategy where
player i correlates his plays in different instantiations of phase 1.) While this is
trivial in traditional game-theoretic analyses, naively applying it in the compu-
tational setting does not necessarily work. It requires us to formally show how
we reduce a polynomial time TM M to a different TM M ’ of the desired form
without blowing up the running time and size of the TM.
For a gameG, letH1,n,fG∞ be the set of histories h ofG
∞ of length at most nf(n)
such that at (the last node of) h, σNE ,` is in phase 1. Let R(M) be the polynomial
that bounds the running time of TM M .
Definition 5.4.3 Given a game G, a deterministic TM M is said to be (G, f, n)-well-
behaved if, when (M,σNE ,`−i ) is played, then either M does not deviate for the first
nf(n) rounds or, after M first deviates, M continues to deviate from sq every time
phase 1 is played in the next nf(n) rounds.
Lemma 5.4.4 For all a, b, c, and all polynomials f , there exists a polynomial g such
that for all n, all games G ∈ Ga,b,c,n, all h ∈ H1,n,fG∞ , all players i, and all TMs M ,
there exists a (G(h), f, n)-well-behaved TM M’ such that pG
h,1/f(n)
i (M
′, ~Mσ
NE,`
−i ) ≥
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p
Gh,1/f(n)
i (M,
~Mσ
NE,`
−i ), and R(M ′), |M ′| ≤ g(R(M)).
Proof: Suppose that we are given G ∈ Ga,b,c,n, h ∈ H1,n,fG∞ , and a TM M . We can
assume without loss of generality that M is deterministic (we can always just
use the best random tape). If M does not deviate in the first nf(n) rounds of
G(h)∞ then M ′ is just M , and we are done. Otherwise, we construct a sequence
of TMs starting withM that are, in a precise sense, more and more well behaved,
until eventually we get the desired TM M ′.
For t1 < t2, say that M is (t1, t2)-(G, f, n)-well-behaved if M does not deviate
from sq until round t1, and then deviates from sq every time phase 1 is played
up to (but not including) round t2 (by which we mean there exists some history
in which M does not deviate at round t2 and this is the shortest such history
over all possible random tapes of ~MσNE,`−i ). We construct a sequence M1,M2, . . .
of TMs such that (a) M1 = M , (b) Mi is (ti1, ti2)-(G, f, n)-well-behaved, (c) ei-
ther ti+11 > ti or t
i+1
1 = t
i
1 and t
i+1
2 > t
i
2, and (d) p
Gh,1/f(n)
i (Mi+1,
~Mσ
NE,`
−i ) ≥
p
Gh,1/f(n)
i (Mi,
~Mσ
NE,`
−i ). Note that if t1 ≥ nf(n) or t2 ≥ t1 + nf(n), then a (t1, t2)-
(G, f, n)-well-behaved TM is (G, f, n)-well-behaved.
Let t < nf(n) be the first round at which M deviates. (This is well defined
since the play up to t is deterministic.) Let the history up to time t be ht. If
M deviates every time that phase 1 is played for the nf(n) rounds after round
t, then again we can take M ′ = M , and we are done. If not, let t′ be the first
round after t at which phase 1 is played and there exists some history of length
t′ at which M does not deviate. By definition, M is (t, t′)-(G, f, n)-well behaved.
We take M1 = M and (t11, t12) = (t, t′). (Note that since ~Mσ
NE,`
−i are randomized
during phase 2, the first time after t at which M returns to playing phase 1 and
does not deviate may depend on the results of their coin tosses. We take t′ to be
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the first time this happens with positive probability.)
Let sh∗ beM ’s memory state at a history h∗. We assume for ease of exposition
that M encodes the history in its memory state. (This can be done, since the
memory state at time t is of size polynomial in t.) Consider the TM M ′′ that acts
like M up to round t, and copies M ’s memory state at that round (i.e., sht). M ′′
continues to plays like M up to the first round t′ with t < t′ < t+nf(n) at which
σNE,` would be about to return to phase 1 andM does not deviate (which means
that M plays an action in the sequence sq at round t′). At round t′, M ′′ sets its
state to sht and simulates M from history ht with states sh(t); so, in particular,
M ′′ does deviate at time t′. (Again, the time t′ may depend on random choices
made by ~MσNE,`−i . We assume that M ′′ deviates the first time M is about to play
phase 1 after round t and does not deviate, no matter what the outcome of the
coin tosses.) This means, in particular, that M ′′ deviates at any such t′. We call
M ′′ a type 1 deviation from M .
If pG
ht ,1/f(n)
i (M
′′, ~Mσ
NE,`
−i ) > p
Gh
t
,1/f(n)
i (M,
~Mσ
NE,`
−i ), then we take M2 = M ′′.
Note that t21 = t11 = t, while t22 > t12 = t′, since M ′′ deviates at t′. If
p
Gh
t
,1/f(n)
i (M
′′, ~Mσ
NE,`
−i ) < p
Gh
t
,1/f(n)
i (M,
~Mσ
NE,`
−i ), then there exists some history
h∗ of both M and M ′′ such that t < |h∗| < t + nf(n), M ′′ deviates at h∗, M
does not, and M has a better expected payoff than M ′′ at h∗. (This is a his-
tory where the type 1 deviation failed to improve the payoff.) Take M2 to be
the TM that plays like ~MσNE,`i up to time t, then sets its state to sh
∗ , and then
plays like M with state sh∗ in history h∗. We call M2 a type 2 deviation from M .
Note that M2 does not deviate at ht (since M did not deviate at history h∗).
Let δ′ = (1 − δ)|h∗|−|ht|. Clearly δ′pGh
t
,1/f(n)
i (M2,
~Mσ
NE,`
−i ) = p
Gh
∗
,1/f(n)
i (M,
~Mσ
NE,`
−i ),
since ~MσNE,`−i acts the same in Gh
t and Gh∗ . Since M ′′ plays like M(sht) at h∗,
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p
Gh
∗
,1/f(n)
i (M
′′, ~Mσ
NE,`
−i ) = δ
′pG
ht ,1/f(n)
i (M,
~Mσ
NE,`
−i ). Combining this with the pre-
vious observations, we get that pG
ht ,1/f(n)
i (M2,
~Mσ
NE,`
−i ) ≥ pG
ht ,1/f(n)
i (M,
~Mσ
NE,`
−i ).
Also note that t21 > t11. This completes the construction of M2. We inductively
construct Mi+1, i = 2, 3, . . ., just as we did M2, letting Mi play the role of M .
Next observe that, without loss of generality, we can assume that this se-
quence arises from a sequence of type 2 deviations, followed by a sequence of
type 1 deviations: For let j1 be the first point in the sequence at which a type 1
deviation is made. We claim that we can assume without loss of generality that
all further deviations are type 1 deviations. By assumption, since Mj1 gives i
higher utility than Mj1−1, it is better to deviate the first time Mj1−1 wants to play
phase 1 again after an initial deviation. This means that when Mj1 wants to play
phase 1 again after an initial deviation it must be better to deviate again, since
the future play of the ~MσNE,`−i is the same in both of these situations. This means
that once a type 1 deviation occurs, we can assume that all further deviations
are type 1 deviations.
Let Mj be the first TM in the sequence that is well behaved. (As we observed
earlier, there must be such a TM.) Using the fact that the sequence consists of
a sequence of type 2 deviations followed by a sequence of type 1 deviations,
it is not hard to show that Mj can be implemented efficiently. First notice that
Mj1 is a TM that plays like ~Mσ
NE,`
i until some round, and then plays M starting
with its state at a history which is at most (nf(n))2 longer than the real history
at this point. This is because its initial history becomes longer by at most nf(n)
at each round and we iterate this construction at most nf(n) times. This means
that its running time is obviously polynomially related to the running time of
the original M . The same is true of the size of Mj1 , since we need to encode
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only the state at this initial history and the history at which we switch, which is
polynomially related to R(M)(n).
To construct Mj , we need to modify Mj1 only slightly, since only type 1 devi-
ations occur. Specifically, we need to know only t1j1 and to encode its state at this
round. At every history after that, we run MJ1 (which is essentially running M
on a longer history) on a fixed history, with a potential additional step of copy-
ing the state. It is easy to see that the resulting TM has running time and size at
most O(R(M)).
We now state and prove our theorem, which shows that there exists a
polynomial-time algorithm for computing a subgame-perfect -equilibrium by
showing that, for all inverse polynomials , there exists a polynomial function `
of  such that σNE∗,` is a subgame-perfect -equilibrium of the game. The main
idea of the proof is to show that the players can’t gain much from deviating
while the sequence is being played, and also that, since the punishment is rel-
atively short, deviating while a player is being punished is also not very prof-
itable.
Theorem 5.4.5 For all a, b, c, and all polynomials q, there is a polynomial f and a
polynomial-time algorithm F such that, for all sequences G1, G2, . . . of games with
Gj ∈ Ga,b,c,j and for all inverse polynomials δ ≤ 1/f , the sequence of outputs
of F given the sequence G1, G2, . . . of inputs is a subgame-perfect 1q -equilibrium for
G∞1 (δ(1)), G
∞
2 (δ(2)), . . ..
Proof: Given a game Gn ∈ G(a, b, c, n), the algorithm finds a correlated equilib-
rium σ of Gn, which can be done in polynomial time using linear programming.
Each player’s expected payoff is at least 0 when playing σ, since we assumed
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that the minimax value of the game is 0. Let r = a − b. By Lemma 5.3.3 and
Lemma 5.3.4, we can construct a sequence sq of length w(n) = 4(rnq(n) + 1)nc
and set f ′(n) = 4rw(n)q(n), so that if the players play sq infinitely often and
δ < 1/f ′(n), then all the players get at least −1/2q(n). The correlated punish-
ment strategy against each player can also be found in polynomial time using
linear programming.
Let m(n) = v(n) + (c − 2)z(n) + 1 (the length of phase (2) plus the round of
deviation). Let `(n) = nq(n)(m(n)a + 1), let σ∗n be the strategy ~Mσ
NE,` described
above, and let f(n) = max(3rq(n)(`(n) +m(n)), f ′(n)).
We now show that σ∗1, σ∗2, . . . is a subgame-perfect (1/q)-equilibrium for ev-
ery inverse polynomial discount factor δ ≤ 1/f . We focus on deviations at his-
tories of length < n
δ(n)
, since, by Lemma 5.3.5, the sum of payoffs received after
that is negligible. Thus, there exists some n0 such that, for all n > n0, the payoff
achieved after that history is less than 1/q(n), which does not justify deviating.
We first show that no player has an incentive to deviate in subgames starting
from phase 1 histories. By Lemma 5.4.4, it suffices to consider only a deviating
strategy that after its first deviation deviates every time phase 1 is played; for
every deviating strategy, either not deviating does at least as well or there is a
deviating strategy of this form that does at least as well. Let h1 be the history
in which the deviation occurs and let M be the deviating strategy. Notice that
~Mσ
NE,` can always act as intended at such histories; it can detect it is in such a
history and can use the history to compute the next move (i.e., it does not need
to maintain memory to figure out what to do next).
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The player’s payoff from (M, ~MσNE,`−i ) during one cycle of deviation and pun-
ishment can be at most a at each round of phase 2 and, by Lemma 5.3.6, is neg-
ligible throughout phase 3. (We use neg to denote the negligible payoff to a
deviator in phase 3.) Thus, the payoff of the deviating player from (M, ~MσNE,`−i )
from the point of deviation onwards is at most
((1− δ(n)|h1|)(δ(n)(m(n)a+ neg) d
nf(n)−|h1|
m(n)+`(n)
e∑
t=0
(1− δ(n))(m(n)+`(n))t + ′neg
)
≤ ((1− δ(n)|h1|)(δ(n)(m(n)a+ neg) ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ(n))(m(n)+`(n))t + ′neg
)
,
where ′neg is the expected payoff after round nf(n). By Lemma 5.3.3, no matter
where in the sequence the players are, the average discounted payoff at that
point from playing honestly is at least −1/2q(n). Thus, the payoff from playing
( ~Mσ
NE,`
) from this point onwards is at least−(1−δ(n))|h1|)1/2q(n).We can ignore
any payoff before the deviation since it is the same whether or not the player
deviates, and also divide both sides by (1 − δ(n))|h1|); thus, it suffices to prove
that
δ(n)(m(n)a+ neg)
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ(n))(m(n)+`(n))t + ′neg ≤
1
q(n)
− 1
2q(n)
.
The term on the left side is bounded by O
( m(n)a+neg
nq(n)(m(n)a+1)
)
, and thus there exists
n1 such that, for all n > n1, the term on the left side is smaller than 12q(n) (In fact,
for all constants c, there exists nc such that the left-hand side is at most 1cq(n) for
any n > nc.)
We next show that no player wants to deviate in phase 2 or 3 histories. Notice
that since these phases are carried out to completion even if the players deviate
while in these phases (we do not punish them for that), the honest strategy can
easily detect whether it is in such a phase by looking at when the last deviation
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from phase 1 occurred. First consider a punishing player. By not following the
strategy, he can gain at most r for at most `(n) + m(n) rounds over the payoff
he gets with the original strategy (this is true even if his memory state is such
that he just plays a fixed action, or even if another player deviates while the
phase is played). Once the players start playing phase 1 again, our previous
claim shows that no matter what the actual history is at that point, a strategy
that does not follow the sequence does not gain much. It is easy to verify that,
given the discount factor, a deviation can increase his discounted payoff by at
most 1
q(n)
in this case. (Notice that the previous claim works for any constant
fraction of 1/q(n), which is what we are using here since the deviation in the
punishment phase gains 1/cq(n) for some c.)
The punished player can deviate to a TM that correctly guessed the keys
chosen (or the current TM’s memory state might contain the actual keys and he
defects to a TM that uses these keys), in which case he would know exactly what
the players are going to do while they are punishing him. Such a deviation exists
once the keys have been played and are part of the history. Another deviation
might be a result of the other TMs being in an inconsistent memory state, so that
they play a fixed action, one which the punished player might be able to take
advantage of. However, these deviations work (or any other possible deviation)
only for the current punishment phase. Once the players go back to playing
phase 1, this player can not gain much by deviating from the sequence again.
For if he deviates again, the other players will choose new random keys and a
new random seed (and will have a consistent memory state); from our previous
claims, this means that no strategy can gain much over a strategy that follows
the sequence. Moreover, he can also gain at most r for at most `(n) + m(n)
rounds which, as claimed before, means that his discounted payoff difference is
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less than 1
q(n)
in this case.
This shows that, for n sufficiently large, no player can gain more than 1/q(n)
from deviating at any history. Thus, this strategy is a subgame-perfect 1/q-
equilibrium.
Using the same arguments as in Section 5.3.3, we can also apply these ideas
to efficiently find a computational subgame-perfect -equilibrium in constant-
degree graphical games.
Corollary 5.4.6 For all a, b, d, and all polynomials q, there is a polynomial f and
a polynomial-time algorithm F such that, for all sequences G1, G2, . . . of games with
Gj ∈ Ga,b,d,j,j and for all inverse polynomials δ ≤ 1/f , the sequence of outputs
of F given the sequence G1, G2, . . . of inputs is a subgame-perfect 1q -equilibrium for
G∞1 (δ(1)), G
∞
2 (δ(2)), . . ..
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CHAPTER 6
COMPUTATIONAL EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES
6.1 Introduction
In the previous section we studied infinitely repeated games, in which the input
to the players naturally grows as part of the game, and thus it makes sense to
talk about polynomial-time bounded agent. But how should we model cases
where the game itself does not grow. Such games have been considered before
in works [14, 26, 39, 40, 67] on solving game-theoretic problems using computa-
tionally bounded players. However there has not really been a careful study of
these models and the solution concepts appropriate for such models. What does
it mean, for example, to say that a fixed finite game played by polynomial-time
players has a Nash equilibrium?
Consider for example the following two-player extensive-form game G
given in Figure 6.1: At the empty history, player 1 secretly chooses one of two
alternatives and puts her choice inside a sealed envelope. Player 2 then also
chooses one of these two alternatives. Since player 2 acts without knowing 1’s
choice, the two histories where 1 made different choices are in the same informa-
tion set of player 2. Finally, player 1 can either open the envelope and reveal her
choice or destroy the envelope. If she opens the envelope and she chose a dif-
ferent alternative than player 2, player 1 wins and gets a utility of 1; otherwise
(i.e., if player 1 either chose the same alternative as player 2 or she destroyed
the envelope) player 1 loses and gets a utility of −1. Player’s 2’s utility is the
opposite of player 1’s.
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III
𝟎 𝟏
𝟎 𝟏
I
𝟎 𝟏
−1 −11 −1−1 −1 1 −1
Open Open Open OpenDestroy Destroy Destroy Destroy
Figure 6.1: A simple coin tossing game.
Resource-bounded players can implement this game even without access to
envelopes, using what is called a commitment scheme. A commitment scheme
is a two-phase two-party protocol involving a sender (player 1 above) and a
receiver (player 2). The sender sends the receiver a message in the first phase
that commits him to a bit without giving the receiver information about the
bit (at least no information that he can efficiently compute from the message);
this is the computational analogue of putting the bit in an envelope. In the
second phase, the sender “opens the envelope” by sending the receiver some
information that allows the receiver to confirm what bit the sender committed
to in the first phase. Thus, we can talk about a game G (actually a sequence of
games as discussed later) where instead of player 1 using an abstract envelope
to send her choice to player 2, she uses a commitment scheme to do so. See
Figure 6.2 for an example of such a game.
Intuitively, we would like to say that the two games represent the same un-
derlying game. However, there are many subtleties in doing so. To get a sense
of the problems, note that to use commitment schemes we need the players to be
computationally bounded. But to talk about computation bounds (for instance,
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Figure 6.2: A coin tossing game with commitments.
polynomial-time TMs), we need to have a sequence of inputs that can grow as a
function of n. So how do we proceed if we want to talk about computationally
bounded players in a fixed finite game? The idea is that we will have a sequence
of games, potentially increasing in size, that represents the single game. As we
shall see, the information structure of the games in the infinite sequence might
differ from that of the underlying game. For example, in the games described
before, while a commitment scheme gives no information to a computationally
bounded player, an unbounded player has complete information; the encrypted
string uniquely identifies the bit that was committed. Thus, unlike in G, com-
mitments to different bits in G are in different information sets for player 2.
Additional complications arise when we consider solution concepts for such
games. Traditional notions of equilibrium involve all players making a best re-
sponse. But if we restrict to computationally bounded players, there may not
be a best response, especially for the kinds of cryptographic problems that we
would like to consider. For example, for every polynomial-time TM, there may
be another TM that does a little better by spending a little longer trying to do
decryption. (See [29] for an example of this phenomenon.) Moreover, when con-
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sidering sequentially rational solution concepts it is unclear what information
structure should be considered since, as we discussed, the information structure
of the computational games does not capture the knowledge of computationally
bounded players.
Our contributions. As a first step to capturing these notions, in Section 6.3.1,
we define what it means for a sequence G = (G1, G2, . . .) of games to represent a
single game G. Intuitively, all the games in the sequence G have the same basic
structure as G, but might use increasingly longer strings to represent actions in
G (e.g., an action a in G might be represented in Gn by an encryption of a that
uses a security parameter of length n). More precisely, we require a mapping
from histories in the games Gn to histories in G, as well as a mapping from
strategies in G to strategies in G, and impose what we argue are reasonable
conditions on these mappings.1 In Section 6.3.2, we show how this definition
play out in the example discussed above.
As hinted before, our conditions do not force the games in G to have the
same information structure as G. While two histories in the same information
set inGn must map to two histories in the same information set inG, it may also
be the case that two histories in different information sets in Gn are mapped to
the same information set in G. Although a player can distinguish two histories
in different information sets (for example a commitment to 0 and a commitment
to 1 in the example are two different strings), at a computational level, she can-
not tell them apart. The encodings just look like random strings to her. There
1The idea of games that depends on a security parameter goes back to Dodis, Halevi, and
Rabin [14]. Huba´cˇek and Park [40] also consider a mapping between histories in a computa-
tional game and histories in an abstract game, although they do not consider the questions in
the same generality that we do here.
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is a sense in which she, as a computationally bounded player, does not under-
stand the “meaning” of these histories (although a computationally unbounded
player could break the commitment and tell them apart). In Section 6.3.3, we
make this intuition precise, showing that our requirements force all histories
that map to the same information set in G to be computationally indistinguishable,
even if they are in different information sets in G.
Once we have defined our model of computational games, we focus on
defining analogues of two solution concepts, Nash equilibrium (NE) and se-
quential equilibrium. In Section 6.4.1, we define a computational analogues of
NE, which considers only deviations that can be implemented by polynomial-
time TMs. It handles previously mentioned complications by allowing for the
strategy to be an  best response for some negligible function . (Our definition
of NE is similar in spirit to the definition in Dodis, Halevi, and Rabin [14].) We
show that if a strategy profile is a NE in the underlying game G, then there is a
corresponding strategy profile of polynomial time TMs that is a computational
NE in G. Thus, we provide conditions that guarantee the existence of a compu-
tational NE, addressing an open question of Katz [45].
In Section 6.4.2, we define a computational analogue of sequential equilib-
rium. It is notoriously problematic to define sequentially rational solution con-
cepts in cryptographic protocols. For example, Gradwohl, Livne, and Rosen [26]
provide a general discussion of the issue, and give a partial solution in terms
of avoiding what they call “empty threats”, which applies only to two-player
games of perfect information, and discuss possible extensions. Our notion of
computational sequential equilibrium, which is quite different in spirit from the
solution concept of Gradwohl, Livne, and Rosen (and arguably conceptually
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much simpler and much closer in spirit to the standard game-theoretic defini-
tion), applies to arbitrary sequence of games that represent a finite game, and
uses the intuitions we develop on the connection between information sets in
the underlying finite game and computational indistinguishability in the se-
quence. We again show that if a strategy profile is a sequential equilibrium in
the underlying game G, then there is a corresponding strategy profile of poly-
nomial time TMs that is a computational sequential equilibrium in G.
An important benefit of our approach is that it separates the game-theoretic
analysis from the cryptographic analysis. We can view the sequence G as an
implementation of an abstract game G. Given this view, we can first prove
that a protocol is a good implementation of an abstract game, and then ana-
lyze the strategic aspects in that simple abstract game. For example, to show a
prescribed cryptographic protocol is a Nash (resp., sequential) equilibrium, we
can first show it represents an abstract ideal game; it then suffices to show that
the protocol corresponds to a strategy profile that is a Nash (resp., sequential)
equilibrium in the much simpler underlying game. We give an example of this
idea in Section 6.5, where we show how our approach can be used to analyze
a protocol for implementing a correlated equilibrium (CE) without a mediator
using cryptography, in the spirit of the work of Dodis, Halevy, and Rabin [14].
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6.2 Preliminaries
6.2.1 Extensive-form games
We begin by reviewing the formal definition of an extensive-form game
(adapted from [56]). A finite extensive-form game G is a tuple ([c], H, P, ~u, ~I)
satisfying the following conditions:
• [c] = {1, . . . , c} is the set of players in the game.
• H is a set of history sequences that satisfies the following two properties:
– the empty sequence 〈 〉 is a member of H ;
– if 〈a1, . . . , aK〉 ∈ H and L < K then 〈a1, . . . , aL〉 ∈ H . The elements of
a history h are called actions.
A history 〈a1, . . . , aK〉 ∈ H is terminal if there is no a such that
〈a1, . . . , aK , a〉 ∈ H . The set of actions available after a nonterminal his-
tory h is denoted A(h) = {a : h · a) ∈ H} (where h · · · a is the result of
concatenating a to the end of h.2 Let HT denote the set of terminal histo-
ries, let HNT denote H \ HT , and let H i denote the histories after which
player i plays.
• P : H \HT → [c]. P (h) specifies the player that moves at history h.
• ~u : HT → Rc specifies for each terminal history the utility of the players at
that history (ui(h) is the utility of player i at terminal history h).
2For technical convenience, we assume that |A(h)| ≥ 2 for all histories h. If this is not the
case, then that step of the game is not interesting, and can essentially be removed.
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• for each player i ∈ [c], Ii is a partition of H i with the property that A(h) =
A(h′) whenever h and h′ are in the same member of the partition. For
I ∈ Ii, we denote by A(I) the set A(h) for h ∈ I (recall that A(h) = A(h′) if
h and h′ are two histories in I). We assume without loss of generality that
if I 6= I ′, then A(I) and A(I ′) are disjoint (we can always rename actions to
ensure that this is the case). We call Ii the information partition of player i; a
set I ∈ Ii is an information set of player i; ~I = (I1, . . . , Ic) is the information
partition structure of the game. A game of perfect information is one where
all the information sets are singletons.
This model can capture situations in which players forget what they knew
earlier. Roughly speaking, a game has perfect recall if the information structure
is such that the players remember everything they knew in the past.
Definition 6.2.1 Let EXP i(h) be the record of player i’s experience in history h, that
is, all the actions he plays and all the information sets he encounters in the history. A
game has perfect recall if, for each player i, we have EXP i(h) = EXP i(h′) whenever
the histories h and h′ are in the same information set for player i.
A deterministic strategy s for player i is a function from Ii to actions, where
for I ∈ Ii, we require that s(I) ∈ A(I). We also consider mixed strategies which
are probability distribution over deterministic strategies. A profile of strategies
~σ = {σ1, . . . , σc} induces a distribution denoted ρ~σ on terminal histories. We
say that a strategy profile is completely mixed if ρ~σ assigns positive probabil-
ity to every history h ∈ HT . The expected value of player i given ~σ is then∑
h∈HT ρ~σ(h)ui(h). NE is then defined just as in normal-form games with these
values.
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Just as in the case of repeated games, NE is not a robust solution concept
for extensive-form games, as it allows for empty threats. As we mentioned in
the previous section, a more robust solution concept that also deals with the
information structure of the game is sequential equilibrium [48]. An equivalent
definition to the one given in the previous section, that does not require beliefs
and is more suitable for the settings in this section is given by the following
theorem:
Theorem 6.2.2 [48, Proposition 6] Let G be an extensive-form game with perfect re-
call. There exists a belief system µ such that (~σ, µ) is a sequential equilibrium of G iff
there exists a sequence of completely mixed strategy profiles ~σ1, ~σ2, . . . converging to
~σ and a sequence δ1, δ2, . . . of nonnegative real numbers converging to 0 such that, for
each player i and each information set I for player i, ~σni is a δn-best response to ~σn−i
conditional on having reached I .
6.2.2 Commitment schemes
We now define a cryptographic commitment scheme that will be used in our
examples. Informally, such a scheme is a two-phase two-party protocol for a
sender and a receiver. In the first phase, the sender sends a message to the
receiver that commits the sender to a bit without giving the receiver any infor-
mation about that bit; in the second phase, the sender reveals the bit to which
he committed in a way that guarantees that this really is the bit he committed
to.
Definition 6.2.3 A secure commitment scheme with perfect bindings is a pair of
PPT algorithms C and R such that:
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• C takes as input a security parameter 1k, a bit b, and a bitstring r, and outputs
C(1k, b, r), C2(1
k, b, r), where C1(1k, b, r), called the commitment string, is a
k-bit string, and C2(1k, b, r), called the commitment key, is a (k−1)-bit string.
We use C(1k, b) to denote the output distribution of algorithm C(1k, b, r) when r
is chosen uniformly at random.
• R is a deterministic algorithm that gets as input two strings c and s and outputs
o ∈ {0, 1, f}.
• (Hiding) {C1(1k, 0)}k∈N and {C1(1k, 1)}k∈N are computationally indistinguish-
able.
• (Perfect binding) R(C1(1k, b, r), (C2(1k, b, r)) = b for all k and r; moreover, if
s 6= C2(1k, b, r), then R(C1(1k, b, r)), s) /∈ {0, 1}.
Cryptographers typically assume that secure commitment schemes with per-
fect bindings exist. (Their existence would follow from the existence of one-way
permutations; see [20] for further discussion and formal definitions.)
6.3 Computational Extensive-Form Games
6.3.1 Definitions
Statements of computational difficulty typically say that there is no (possibly
randomized) polynomial-time algorithm for solving a problem. To make sense
of this, we need to consider, not just one input, but a sequence of inputs, getting
progressively larger. Similarly, to make sense of computational games, we can-
not consider a single game, but rather must consider a sequence of games that
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grow in size. The games in the sequence share the same basic structure. This
means that, among other things, they involve the same set of players, playing
in the same order, with corresponding utility functions. To make this precise,
we first start with a more general notion, which we call a computable uniform
sequence of games.
Definition 6.3.1 A computable uniform sequence G = {G1, G2, . . .} of games is
a sequence that satisfies the following conditions:
• All the games in the sequence involve the same set of players.
• Let Hn be the set of histories in Gn. There exists a polynomial p such that, for all
nonterminal histories h ∈ HNTn , A(h) ⊆ {0, 1}≤p(n).3 In addition, there is a PPT
algorithm that, on input 1n and a history h, determines whether h ∈ Hn.
• There exists a polynomial-time computable function P ′ from ⋃∞n=1(HNTn ) to [c].
The function Pn in game Gn ∈ G is then P ′ restricted to HNTn .
• For each player i, there exists a polynomial-time computable function ui :⋃∞
n=1H
T
n → R such that the utility function of player i in game Gn is ui re-
stricted to HTn .
We sometimes call a computable uniform sequence of games a computational game.
Computable uniform sequences of games already suffice to allow us to talk
about polynomial-time strategies. A strategy M for player i in a computable
uniform sequence G = (G1, G2, . . .) is a probabilistic TM that takes as input a
pair (1n, v), where v is a view for player i in Gn (discussed below), and outputs
3{0, 1}≤p(n) denotes the language consisting of bitstrings of length at most p(n).
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an action in A(I). We assume that the TMs are stateful; they have a tape on
which the random bits used in previous rounds are recorded. The view of a
stateful TM M for player i in Gn is a tuple (vI , r), where vI is the representation
of information set I and r contains the randomness that has been used thus far
(so is nondecreasing from round to round). This can be viewed as having perfect
recall of randomness, as the TMs are not allowed to “forget” the randomness
they used. It is considered part of their experience so far in the same way as the
actions that they played and the information sets that they visited.4
We next define what it means for a uniform sequence G = (G1, G2, . . .) of
games to represent an underlying game G. To explain different aspects of this
definition, it is useful to go back to the example in the introduction and discuss
what it means for a sequence G to represent the game G in Figure 6.1. As dis-
cussed before, we can implement this game using a commitment scheme. The
point is that now we get, not one game, but a sequence of games, one for each
choice of security parameter. Rather than putting a bit b in an envelope, in Gn
player 1 sends C1(1n, b). More precisely, he sends C1(1n, b, r), for a string r cho-
sen chosen uniformly at random. To then open the envelope, player 1 can just
send C2(1n, b, r) and any other string to destroy it.
Roughly speaking, we want all the games in G to have the same “structure”
as G. We formalize this by requiring a surjective mapping fn from histories in
each game Gn in the sequence to histories in G. Note that fn is not, in general,
one-to-one. There may be many histories in Gn representing a single history in
G. This can already be seen in our example; each of the histories in Gn where
4 This assumption is equivalent to allowing the TM to have an additional tape on which it
can save an arbitrary state. For any TM M that does this, there is an equivalent TM M ′ that
has no additional tape, but simply reconstructs M ’s state by simulating M ’s computation from
scratch using its view. This suffices, for example, to reconstruct a secret key that was generated
in the first round, so it can be used in later rounds.
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player 1 sends C1(1n, 1, r) get mapped to the history in G where player 1 puts 1
in an envelope. Moreover, although C1(1n, 0, r) and C1(1n, 1, r) get mapped to
histories in the same information set in G, they are not in the same information
set in Gn; an exponential-time player can break the encryption and tell that they
correspond to different bits being put in the envelope. Thus, the mapping fn
does not completely preserve the information structure. We require that h and
fn(h) have the same length (same number of actions). Of course, the utility
associated with a terminal history h in Gn is the same as that associated with
history fn(h) in G.
The first three conditions below capture the relatively straightforward struc-
tural requirements above. The final requirement imposes conditions on the
players’ strategies, and is somewhat more complicated. Informally, the fourth
requirement is that there is a mapping F from strategies in G to strategies in
G, where F(σ) “corresponds” to σ in some appropriate sense. But what should
“correspond” mean? Let ~M be a strategy profile for G. For each gameGn ∈ G, ~M
induces a distribution denoted ψGn~M on the terminal histories in Gn. By applying
fn, we can push this forward to a distribution φGn~M on the terminal histories in
G. A mixed strategy profile ~σ in G also induces a distribution on the terminal
histories in G, denoted ρ~σ.
Definition 6.3.2 A strategy profile ~σ corresponds to ~M if {φGn~M }n∈N is statistically
close to {ρ~σ}n∈N: that is, if HT are the terminal histories of G, then there exists a
negligible function  such that, for all n,
∑
h∈HT
|PrφGn
~M
[h]− Prρ~σ [h]| ≤ (n).
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So one requirement we will have is that, for all strategy profiles ~σ inG, ~σ cor-
responds to (F(σ1), . . . ,F(σn)), which we abbreviate as F(~σ). In addition, we
require that the strategy profile F(~σ) “knows” which underlying action it plays.
We formalize this by requiring that, for strategy σ in the underlying game, there
is a TM Mσ that, given view v for player i in G, outputs the action in G corre-
sponding to the action played by F(σ) given view v.
Finally, we require a partial converse to the correspondence requirement. It
is clearly too much to expect a full converse. G has a richer structure than G; it
allows for more ways for the players to coordinate than G. So we cannot expect
every strategy profile in G to correspond to a strategy profile in G. Thus, we
require only that strategies in a rather restricted class of strategy profiles in G
correspond to a strategy in G: namely, ones where we start with a strategy of
the form F(~σ) (which, by assumption, corresponds to ~σ), and allow one player
to deviate. We must also use a weaker notion of correspondence here. For ex-
ample, in the game in Figure 6.1, even if we start with a strategy of the form
F(~σ), the deviating strategy M ′1 could be such that player 1 commits to 0 in Gn
for n even, and commits to 1 in Gn for n odd. The strategy profile (M ′1,F(σ2))
does not correspond to any strategy profile in G. Thus, the notion of correspon-
dence that we consider in this case is that if i plays M ′i rather than F(σi), then
there exists a sequence σ′1, σ′2, . . . of strategies in G, rather than a single strat-
egy σ′, and require only that the sequence {φGn(M ′i ,F(~σ−i))}n∈N be computationally
indistinguishable from {ρ~σ}n∈N, rather than being statistically close.
Definition 6.3.3 A computable uniform sequence G = {G1, G2, . . .} represents an
underlying game G if the following conditions hold:
UG1. G and every game in G involve the same set of players.
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UG2. For each game Gn ∈ G, there exists a surjective mapping fn from the histories in
Gn to the histories in G such that
(a) |h| = |fn(h)|;
(b) the same player moves in h and fn(h);
(c) if h′ is a subhistory of h, then fn(h′) is a subhistory of fn(h);
(d) if h and h′ are in the same information set in Gn, then fn(h) and fn(h′) are
in the same information set in G;
(e) for h ∈ H (a history of G), let LA(h) denote the last action played in h;
if h and h′ are in the same information set in Gn, then for any a such that
h||a ∈ Hn, LA(fn(h||a)) = LA(fn(h′||a)) (where || is the concatenation
operator).
UG3. If h is a terminal history of Gn, then the utility of each player i is the same in h
and fn(h).
UG4. There is a mapping F from strategies in G to strategies in G such that
(a) for all strategy profiles ~σ in G, ~σ corresponds to
F(~σ) = (F(σ1), . . . ,F(σn));
(b) for each strategy σ for player i in G, there exists a polynomial-time TM Mσ
that, given as input 1n and a view v for player i in Gn that is reachable
when player i plays F(σi) in Gn, returns an action for player i such that
LA(fn(F(σ)(1n, v, rT ))) = Mσ(1n, v, rT ), where rT is the random tape
used (remember that the view contains the randomness used so far);
(c) for all strategy profiles ~σ in G, all players i, and all polynomial-time strate-
gies M ′i for player i in G, there exists a sequence σ′1, σ′2, . . . of strategies for
player i in G such that {φGn(M ′i ,F(~σ−i))}n is computationally indistinguishable
from {ρG(σ′n,~σ−i)}n.
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Definition 6.3.3 requires the existence of a sequence ~f = (f1, f2 . . .) in UG2
and a function F in UG4. When we want to refer specifically to f and F , we say
that G 〈~f,F〉-represents G.
Note that UG2 requires that if h and h′ are in the same information set in Gn,
then fn(h) and fn(h′) must be in the same information set in G. This means that
we can view fn as a map from information sets to information sets. However,
it does not require the converse. As discussed above, in G, an exponential-time
player may be able to make distinctions between histories that cannot be made
of the corresponding histories in the underlying game. We would like to be able
to say that a polynomial-time player cannot distinguish h and h′ if fn(h) and
fn(h
′) are in the same information set. As we show later, these conditions allow
us to make such a claim.
Also note that since the game is finite, to show UG4(a) and UG4(b) hold, it is
enough to prove they hold for deterministic strategies. Given a mapping F that
satisfies UG4(a) and (b) for deterministic strategies, we can extend it to mixed
strategies in the obvious way: since a mixed strategy is just a probability dis-
tribution over finitely many deterministic strategies, it can be implemented by
a TM that plays that probability distribution up to negligible precision over the
corresponding mapping of the deterministic strategies (such an approximating
distribution can be easily constructed in polynomial time). It is obvious that
UG4(a) still holds. UG4(b) holds since using v and rT , we can reconstruct which
deterministic strategy σ′ in the support of σ was actually used to reach v, and
then use the corresponding TM Mσ′ .
112
6.3.2 The commitment game as a uniform computable se-
quence
We now consider how these definitions play out in the gameG in Figure 6.1 and
the sequence G = (G1, G2, . . .) described above where player 1 uses a commit-
ment scheme as an envelope.
Lemma 6.3.4 G represents G.
Proof: First, we show that G is a computable uniform sequence. All the games
in the sequence involve exactly 2 players; the set of histories in Gn is a subset of
{0, 1}≤n, and it is easy to compute the next player to act; finally, the utility func-
tions are polynomial-time computable by using the TM R of the commitment
scheme.
Next we show that the sequence represents G. There is an obvious mapping
from histories of the games in the sequence to histories of G: a commitment to 0
is mapped to 0, a commitment to 1 is mapped to 1, the action of player 2 is just
mapped to the action in G, player 1 providing the right key is mapped to action
“open”, and player 1 providing a wrong key is mapped to “destroy”. Finally, it
is easy to verify that UG3 (the condition on utilities) holds.
To show that UG4 holds, we need to define a function F . A strategy for
player 2 in G can’t depend on player 1’s action, since player 2’s information set
contains both actions. Thus, a deterministic strategy σ2 for player 2 in G just
plays an action in {0, 1}; the corresponding strategy F(σ2) just plays the same
string. UG4(b) holds trivially in this case. To define F(σ1) for a strategy σ1 for
player 1, we need to show how to implement each action of player 1. To play
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b at the empty history in Gn, 1 plays the commitment string C1(1n, b, r), where
r is the randomness used by player 1 in the computation (which is then saved
as the TM’s state). To play the action “open”, it computes k = C2(1n, b, r); to
play “destroy”, it plays k ⊕ 1 (a string other than the right key). It is easy to
see that UG4(b) holds for strategies of player 1. Moreover, it is easy to see that
F(~σ) corresponds to ~σ, so UG4(a) holds. We extend F to mixed strategies as
described above.
To see that UG4(c) holds, observe that a strategy for player 1 inGn can clearly
be mapped to a strategy in G: At the empty history player 1 has some distri-
bution over commitments to 0 and commitments to 1. This clearly maps to a
distribution over putting 0 and 1 in the envelope. At the other nodes where
player 1 moves, Gn induces a distribution over correctly revealing the commit-
ment or doing some other action; again, this clearly maps to a distribution over
“open” and “destroy” in the obvious way. Since a strategy M ′1 for player 1 in G
induces, for all n, a strategy M ′1,n for player 1 in Gn, we can associate a sequence
(σ′1, σ
′
2, . . .) with M ′1. It is easy to check that, for all strategies σ2 for player 2 in
G, {φGn(M ′i ,F(σ2))}n is computationally indistinguishable from {ρ
G
(σ′n,σ2)
}n.
We similarly want to associate with each strategy for player 2 in G a sequence
of strategies inG. This is a little more delicate, since the information structure in
Gn is not the same as that inG. Given a strategy σ1 for player 1 inG, and an arbi-
trary polynomial-time strategy M2 for player 2 in G, let Pn(b) be the probability
that M2 plays b when (F(σ1),M2) is played in Gn. Let σ′n be the strategy in G
that plays according to the same distribution. We now claim that {φGn(F(σ1),M2)}n
is indistinguishable from {ρGσ1,σ′n}n. Assume, by way of contradiction, that it
is not. This can happen only if, for infinitely many n, M2 plays 0 and 1 with
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non-negligibly different probabilities, depending on whether it is faced with a
commitment to 0 or a commitment to 1. But that means that, for infinitely many
n, it can distinguish those two events with non-negligible probability. This con-
tradicts the assumption that the commitment scheme is secure.
6.3.3 Consistent partition structures
In this section, we discuss the connection between computational indistin-
guishability and information structure in games. As we saw, when going from
the game G in Figure 6.1 to the game G that represents it, we replaced the infor-
mation set in G (the use of an envelope) with computational indistinguishabil-
ity (a commitment scheme). Although the games in G are perfect information
games, so that the players have complete information about a history, if player
1 uses the commitment scheme appropriately, then player 2 does not really un-
derstand the “meaning” of a history (i.e., whether it represents a commitment
to 0 or a commitment to 1). On the other hand, if player 1 “cheats” by using, for
example, some low-entropy random string for the commitment, player 2 might
have a strategy that is able to understand the “meaning” of its action. Thus,
there is a sense in which the information structure of a computational game de-
pends on the strategies of the players. This dependence on strategies does not
exist in standard games. If each of two histories h and h′ in some information
set I for player i has a positive probability of being reached by a particular strat-
egy profile, then when player i is in I , he will not know which of h or h′ was
played, even if he knows exactly what strategies are being played. The situation
is different for computational games, in a way we now make precise.
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Suppose that G = (G1, G2, . . .) 〈~f,F〉-represents G and h is a history of G, so
that f−1n (h) is the set of histories of Gn that are mapped to h by fn. For a set H of
histories of a game Gn ∈ G, let Vn(H) be the set of views that a player can have
at histories in H when Gn is played. For a strategy profile ~M in G, let ξGn~M (v) be
the probability of reaching view v ∈ Vn(H) if the players play strategy profile ~M
in Gn. For a set V of views, let ξGn~M (V ) =
∑
v∈V ξ
Gn
~M
(v). For a set V of mutually
incompatible views (i.e., a set V of views such that for all distinct views v, v′ ∈ V ,
the probability of reaching v given that v′ is reached is 0, and vice versa), letXV~M,n
be a probability distribution on V such that XV~M,n(v) =
ξGn
~M
(v)
ξGn
~M
(V )
if ξGn~M (V ) > 0, and
1
|V | otherwise. Let ξ
G
~σ (S) denote the probability of reaching a set S of histories in
G if the players play strategy profile ~σ. Note that if ξG~σ (S) > 0, then by UG4, for
all sufficiently large n, we must have ξGn~M~σ(Vn(f
−1
n (S))) > 0.
Definition 6.3.5 Let G 〈~f,F〉-represent a gameG and let ~M be a strategy in G. A par-
tition Ii of H i (recall that this is the set of histories in G where i plays) is ~M -consistent
for player i if, for all non-singleton I ∈ Ii and all h ∈ I such that both ξGn~M (Vn(f−1n (h)))
and ξGn~M (Vn(f−1n (I \ h))) are non-negligible, {X
Vn(f−1n (h))
~M,n
}n∈N is computationally in-
distinguishable from {XVn(f−1n (I\{h}))~M,n }n∈N. A partition structure ~I is ~M -consistent if,
for all agents i, ~Ii is ~M -consistent.
Intuitively, a partition Ii for player i is consistent with a strategy profile ~M ,
if, when ~M is played in G, for all I ∈ Ii and all histories h, h′ ∈ I , the distri-
bution over views that map to h is computationally indistinguishable from the
distribution over views that map to h′. In our example, this means that player
2 can’t distinguish between the distribution created by a commitment to 0 and
the distribution created by a commitment to 1 if the commitment algorithm is
run “honestly” (using truly random strings).
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Note that we do not enforce any condition on histories in G that are mapped
back to a set of histories that is reached with only negligible probability. This
means there might be more than one ~M -consistent information partition.
We next show that if Ii is the information partition of player i in G, and
G 〈~f,F〉-represent G then for any strategy profile ~σ in G, Ii must be F(~σ)-
consistent.
Theorem 6.3.6 If G 〈~f,F〉-represents G, Ii is the information partition of player i in
G, and ~σ is a strategy profile in G then Ii is F(~σ)-consistent.
Proof: We must show that if I ∈ Ii is a non-singleton information set for
i in G and h ∈ I , then for all strategy profiles ~σ in G such that ξG~σ (h) > 0
and ξG~σ (I \ {h}) > 0, {XVn(f
−1
n (h))
F(~σ),n }n∈N is computationally indistinguishable from
{XVn(f−1n (I\{h}))F(~σ),n }n∈N.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that h ∈ I , I is an information set for
player i in G, and there exists a strategy profile ~σ in G that reaches both h and
I \ {h}with positive probability such that {XVn(f−1n (h))F(~σ),n }n is distinguishable from
{XVn(f−1n (I\{h}))F(~σ),n }n. Thus, there exists a distinguisher D for these distributions.
Let a and a′ be distinct actions in A(I). (Recall that we assumed that |A(I)| ≥
2.) Let M ′ be a strategy for player i in G such that when M ′ reaches a history
that maps to I (by UG4(b) and the fact that the sets of actions available in each
information set are disjoint, this can be checked in polynomial time), M ′ uses
D to distinguish if its view is in Vn(f−1n (h)) or Vn(f−1n (I \ {h})). M ′ then plays
an action mapped to a if D returns 0 and an action mapped to a′ otherwise. At
a history other than one in f−1n (I), M ′ plays like F(σi). It is easy to see that,
because {Xf−1n (h)F(~σ),n}n and {Xf
−1
n (I\{h})
F(~σ),n }n are distinguishable with non-negligible
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probability, there is a non-negligible probability that the strategy M ′ is able to
detect which case holds, and play accordingly. That means that when histories
of (M ′,F(σ−i)) are mapped to histories of G via fn, there is a non-negligible gap
between the probability of (h, a) and the probability of (h′, a) for h′ ∈ I \ {h}.
Since h ∈ I , there can be no strategy σ′ for player i such that (σ′, σ−i) has such a
gap, and UG4(c) cannot hold. This gives us the desired contradiction.
Note that Theorem 6.3.6 holds trivially if, for all Gi ∈ G, all the histories
of G that map to I are in the same information set in Gi. The theorem is of
interest only when this is not the case. If we think of G as an abstract model
of a computational game G that represents it, this result can be thought of as
saying that information sets in G can model both real lack of information and
computational indistinguishability in G.
6.4 Solution Concepts for Computational Games
In this section, we consider analogues of two standard solution concepts in the
context of computational games: Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium,
and prove that they exist if the computational game represents a finite extensive-
form game.
6.4.1 Computational Nash equilibrium
Informally, a strategy profile in G is a computational Nash equilibrium if no
player i has a profitable polynomial-time deviation, where a deviation is taken to
be profitable if it is profitable in infinitely many games in the sequence. Recall
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that ψGn~M is the distribution on the terminal histories in Gn induced by a strategy
profile ~M in G.
Definition 6.4.1 ~M = {M1, . . . ,Mc} is a computational Nash equilibrium of a
computable uniform sequence G if, for all players i ∈ [c] and for all polynomial-time
strategies M ′i in G for player i, there exists a negligible function , such that for all n,∑
h∈HTn
ψGn~M (h)ui(h) ≥
∑
h∈HTn
ψGn
(M ′, ~M−i)
(h)ui(h)− (n).
Our definition of computational NE is similar in spirit to that of Dodis,
Halevi, and Rabin [14], although they formalize it by having the strategies de-
pend on a security parameter and the utilities depend only on actions in a single
normal-form game (rather than a sequence of extensive-form games). Our def-
inition (and theirs) differs from the standard definition of -NE in two ways.
First, we restrict to polynomial-time deviations. This seems in keeping with our
focus on polynomial-time players. Second, we have a negligible loss of utility 
in the definition, and  depends on the deviation. (The fact that  depends on the
deviation means that what we are considering cannot be considered an -Nash
equilibrium in the standard sense.) Of course, we could have given a defini-
tion more in the spirit of the standard definition of Nash equilibrium by simply
taking  to be 0. However, the resulting solution concept would simply not be
very interesting, given our restriction to polynomial-time players. In general,
there will not be a “best” polynomial-time strategy; for every polynomial-time
TM, there may be another TM that is better and runs only slightly longer. For
example, player 2 may be able to do a little better by spending a little more
time trying to decrypt the commitment in a commitment scheme. (See also the
examples in [29].)
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We now show that our model allows us to provide conditions that guarantee
the existence of a computational NE; to the best of our knowledge, this has
not been done before (and is mentioned as an open question in [45]). More
specifically, we show that if a computational game G representsG, then for every
NE ~σ in G, there is a corresponding NE in G.
Theorem 6.4.2 If G 〈~f,F〉-represents G and ~σ is a NE in G, then F(~σ) is a computa-
tional NE of G.
Proof: Suppose that ~σ is a NE in G. By UG4, ~σ corresponds to F(~σ). Thus,
there exists some negligible function  such that, for all n,
∑
h∈HT
φGnF(~σ)(h)ui(h) >
∑
h∈HT
ρG~σ (h)ui(h)− (n).
We claim that ~M~σ is a computational NE of G. Assume, by way of contradiction,
that it is not. That means there is some player i, some strategy M ′i for player i,
and some constant c > 0 such that, for infinitely many values of n,
∑
h∈HT
φGn(M ′,F(~σ−i))(h)ui(h) >
∑
h∈HT
φGnF(~σ)(h)ui(h) +
1
nc
;
If not, we could have constructed a negligible function to satisfy the equilibrium
condition.
By combining the two equation we get that for infinitely many values of n,
∑
h∈HT
φGn(M ′,F(~σ−i))(h)ui(h) >
∑
h∈HT
ρG~σ (h)ui(h)− (n) +
1
nc
.
Since ~σ is a NE, we get that for all sequences σ′1, σ′2 . . . of strategies for player i
in G, ∑
h∈HT
ρG~σ (h)ui(h) ≥
∑
h∈HT
ρG(σ′n,~σ−i)(h)ui(h).
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This means that for infinitely many values of n, and for any such sequence,
∑
h∈HT
φGn(M ′,F(σ−i))(h)ui(h) >
∑
h∈HT
ρG(σ′n,~σ−i)(h)ui(h)− (n) +
1
nc
.
But this contradicts UG4(c), which says that there must exist a sequence σ′1, σ′2 . . .
such that {φGn(M ′i ,F(~σ−i))}n is computationally indistinguishable from {ρ
G
(σ′n,~σ−i)
}n.
Since the difference between the two payoffs is not negligible, a distinguisher
could just sample enough outcomes of these strategies and compute the aver-
age payoff to distinguish the two distributions with non-negligible probability.
Thus, ~M~σ must be a computational NE of G.
Theorem 6.4.2 shows that every NE in G has a corresponding NE in G. The
converse does not hold. This should not be surprising; the set of strategies in G
is much richer than that inG. The following example gives a simple illustration.
Example 6.4.3 Consider the 2-player gameG′ that is like the game in Figure 6.1,
except that the payoff is 1 to both if they match and 0 otherwise (and both get
−1 if player 1 does not open the envelope). This game has three NE: both play
0; both play 1; and both play the mixed strategy that gives probability 1/2 to
each of 0 and 1. There is a computational game G ′ that represents G′ that is
essentially identical to the game G described in Section 6.3.2, except that the
payoffs are modified appropriately. The game G ′ has many more equilibria than
G′, since player 1 can commit to 0 and 1 with 0.5 probability but use a fixed key
that the second player knows (or choose a random key from a low entropy set
that the second player can enumerate). Player 2 can take advantage of this to
always play the matching action. There is no strategy in G′ that can mimic this
behavior.
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6.4.2 Computational sequential equilibrium
Our goal is to define a notion of computational sequential equilibrium. To do
so, it is useful to think about the standard definition of sequential equilibrium
at an abstract level. Essentially, ~σ is a sequential equilibrium if, for each player i,
there is a partition I ′i of the histories where i plays such that, at each cell I ∈ I ′i,
player i has beliefs about the likelihood of being at each history in I , and the
action that he chooses at a history in I according to σi is a best response, given
these beliefs and what the other agents are doing (i.e., σ−i). The standard defini-
tion of sequential equilibrium takes the partition I ′i to consist of i’s information
sets. If we partition the histories into singletons, we get a subgame-perfect equi-
librium [63]. As we argued in Section 6.3.3, the information sets in G are too
fine, in general, to capture a player’s ability to distinguish. Thus, as a first step
to getting a notion of computational sequential equilibrium, we generalize the
standard definition of sequential equilibrium in a straightforward way to get ~I-
sequential equilibrium, where Ii is an arbitrary partition of the histories where
i plays.
Definition 6.4.4 Given a partition ~I, ~σ is a ~I-sequential equilibrium of G if there
exists a sequence of completely mixed strategy profiles ~σ1, ~σ2, . . . converging to ~σ and
a sequence δ1, δ2, . . . of nonnegative real numbers converging to 0 such that, for each
player i and each set I ∈ Ii, ~σni is a δn-best response to ~σn−i conditional on having
reached I .
What are reasonable partition structures to use when considering a compu-
tational game? As we suggested, using the information partition structure of G
seems unreasonable. For example, in our example commitment game, this does
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not allow the second player to act the same when facing commitments to 0 and
commitments to 1, although, as we argued earlier, if player 1 plays appropri-
ately, a computationally bounded player cannot distinguish these two events.
It seems reasonable to have histories in the same cell of the partition if the
player cannot distinguish what these histories actually “represent”. For general
uniform computable sequences it is unclear what “represents” should mean.
However, if G represents a game G, then we do have in some sense a represen-
tation for a history: the history it maps to in the underlying game. As we saw
in Section 6.3.3, what a player can infer from a history might depend not just on
the information partition structure of the games in G, but also on the strategies
played by the players in G. Thus, a natural candidate for a partition structure
~I when ~M is the strategy profile played is a partition that is based on an ~M -
consistent partition structure ~IG of the histories of G. We now formalize this
intuition.
Suppose that G 〈~f,F〉-represents G. Given a set I ⊆ H , let IGn be the set
consisting of histories h ∈ Gn such that fn(h) ∈ I . Given two strategies M and
M ′ for a player in G, let (M, I,M ′) be the TM that plays like M in Gn up to IGn ,
and then switches to playing M ′ from that point on. For a game Gn ∈ G, a
strategy profile ~M , and a set H ′n of histories in Gn that is reached with positive
probability when ~M is played, let φGn~M,H′n
be the probability on terminal histories
in G induced by pushing forward the probability on terminal histories in Gn
conditioned on reaching H ′n (where we identify the event “reaching H ′n” with
the set of terminal histories that extend a history in H ′n). We can similarly define
ρG~σ,H′ for a subset H
′ of histories in G.
Definition 6.4.5 Suppose that G 〈~f,F〉-represents G. Then ~M = {M1, . . . ,Mc} is a
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computational sequential equilibrium of G if there exists a sequence of completely
mixed strategies ~M1, ~M2, . . . converging to ~M and a sequence δ1, δ2, . . . converging to
0 such that, for all k, n, and players i ∈ [c], there exists an ~M -consistent partition Ii
such that, for all sets I ∈ Ii and all polynomial-time strategies M ′ for player i in G,
there exists a negligible function  such that
∑
h∈HT
φGn~Mk,IGn
(h)ui(h) ≥
∑
h∈HT
φGn
(( ~Mki ,I,M
′), ~Mk−i),IGn
(h)ui(h)− (n)− δk.
We now claim that, as with NE, if ~σ is a sequential equilibrium of an exten-
sive form game G with perfect recall and G 〈~f,F〉-represents G, then F(~σ) is a
computational sequential equilibrium of G.
Theorem 6.4.6 Suppose that G 〈~f,F〉-represents G and G has perfect recall. If there
exists a belief function µ such that (~σ, µ) is a sequential equilibrium in G, then F(~σ) is
a computational sequential equilibrium of G.
Proof: Suppose that there exists a belief system µ such that (~σ, µ) is a sequential
equilibrium in G. Thus, there exists a sequence of completely mixed strategy
profiles ~σ1, ~σ2, . . . that converges to ~σ and a sequence δ1, δ2, . . . that converges to
0 such that for all players i, all information sets I for i in G, and all strategies σ′
for i that act like σ on all prefixes of histories in I , we have that
∑
h∈HT
ρG~σk,I(h)ui(h) ≥
∑
h∈HT
ρG(σ′,~σk−i),I
(h)ui(h)− δk. (6.1)
Assume, by way of contradiction, that ~M = F(~σ) is not a computational sequen-
tial equilibrium. Let Mki be the TM that acts like F(σki ) except that at a view it
is called to play, with probability 1
2nk
(which is negligible), it plays an arbitrary
legal action, chosen uniformly at random. Note that this makes Mki completely
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mixed, while ensuring that ~Mk still corresponds to ~σk. Also note that the se-
quence ~M1, ~M2, . . . converges to ~M . By Theorem 6.3.6, if Ii is the information
partition of player i in G, then Ii is ~Mk-consistent for all k, and, in particular, is
also ~M -consistent. Since ~M is not a computational sequential equilibrium, there
must be some k, player i, information set I for i in G, strategy M ′i for i, and
constant c such that, for infinitely many values of n,∑
h∈HT
φGn
(( ~Mki ,I,M
′), ~Mk−i),IGn
(h)ui(h) >
∑
h∈HT
φGn~Mk,IGn
(h)ui(h) +
1
nc
+ δk. (6.2)
Since ~σk is completely mixed, every terminal history is reached with posi-
tive probability. Thus, IGn is reached with positive probability. Since ~Mk corre-
sponds to ~σk, {φGn~Mk,IGn}n (the conditional ensemble) must be statistically close
to {ρG
~σk,I
}n, for otherwise we could use the distinguisher for these ensembles
to distinguish the unconditional ensembles. It follows that there exists some
negligible function  such that, for all n,∑
h∈HT
φGn~Mk,IGn
(h)ui(h) >
∑
h∈HT
ρG~σk,I(h)ui(h)− (n). (6.3)
From (6.2) and (6.3), it follows that, for infinitely many values of n,∑
h∈HT
φGn
(( ~Mki ,I,M
′), ~Mk−i),IGn
(h)ui(h) >
∑
h∈HT
ρG~σk,I(h)ui(h)− (n) +
1
nc
+ δk. (6.4)
By UG4(c), there is a sequence σ′1, σ′2, . . . of strategies for i in G such that
{φGn
(( ~Mki ,I,M
′), ~Mk−i
)}n is computationally indistinguishable from {ρG(σ′n,~σk−i)}n. Since,
for n sufficiently large, IGn is reached with non-negligible probability by ~Mk,
and ( ~Mki , I,M ′) acts like ~Mki in all prefixes of histories in IGn , it must be the case
that for n sufficiently large, (( ~Mki , I,M ′), ~Mk−i) reaches IGn with non-negligible
probability. Moreover, {φGn
(( ~Mki ,I,M
′), ~Mk−i),IGn
}n is computationally indistinguish-
able from {ρG
(σ′n,~σk−i),I
}n. If not, again, a distinguisher for the unconditional distri-
butions can just use the distinguisher for the conditional distribution by calling
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it only when the sampled history is such that I is visited. From (6.1) and (6.4),
we get that for infinitely many values of n,
∑
h∈HT
φGn
(( ~Mki ,I(I),M ′), ~Mk−i),IGn
(h)ui(h) >
∑
h∈HT
ρG(σ′n,~σk−i),I
(h)ui(h)(h)ui(h)− (n) + 1
nc
.
But, as in previous arguments, this contradicts the assumption that
{φGn
(( ~Mki ,I,M
′
i),
~Mk−i),IGn
}n is computationally indistinguishable from {ρG(σ′n,~σk−i),I}n.
Thus, ~M~σ is a computational sequential equilibrium of G.
What are the beliefs represented by this equilibrium? The beliefs we get are
such that the players believe that, except with negligible probability, only strate-
gies that are mappings (via F) of strategies in the underlying game were used,
so they explain deviations in the computational game in terms of deviations in
the underlying game.
One consequence of using completely mixed strategies in the standard set-
ting is that a player always assigns positive probability to wherever he may find
himself. In our setting, while we also require strategies to be completely mixed,
a player i may still find himself in a situation (i.e., may have a view) to which
he ascribes probability 0, so he knows his beliefs are bound to be incorrect. This
can happen only if the randomness in i’s state is inconsistent with the moves
that i made that led to the current view. (This can happen if, for example, i
ignored the random string when computing the commitment string, and just
outputted a string of all 1’s.) While i may ascribe probability 0 to his earlier
moves, deviations by other players always result in views to which i ascribes
positive probability, so such deviations cannot be used as signals or threats.
By considering a consistent partitions here, we effectively average the ex-
pected payoff over all histories of Gn that map to the same information set in
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I . Note that, for each specific history in this set, there might be a better TM.
For example, in the commitment game discussed before, for each commitment
string, there is a TM for player 2 that does better than the prescribed protocol:
the one that plays the right value given that string. However, our notion consid-
ers the expected value over all these histories, and thus a good deviation does
not exist. Since no polynomial-time TM can tell to which histories in the un-
derlying game these histories are mapped (via f ), we treat cells in a consistent
partition just as traditional information sets are treated in the standard notion
of sequential equilibrium.
6.5 Application: Implementing a Correlated Equilibrium
Without a Mediator
In this section, we show that our approach can help us analyze protocols that
use cryptography to implement a correlated equilibrium (CE) in a normal-form
game. Dodis, Halevi, and Rabin [14] (DHR) were the first to use cryptographic
techniques to implement a CE. They did so using a protocol that they showed
was a NE, provided that players are computationally bounded (for a notion of
computational NE that is related to ours). However, as discussed by Gradwohl,
Livne, and Rosen [26] (GLR), DHR’s proposed protocol does not satisfy solu-
tion concepts that also require some sort of sequential rationality. DHR’s pro-
tocol punishes deviations using a minimax strategy that may give the punisher
as well as the player being punished a worse payoff; thus, it is just an empty
threat. To deal with this issue, GLR introduce a solution concept that they call
Threat Free Equilibrium (TFE), which explicitly eliminates such empty threats.
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GLR additionally provide a protocol that can implement a CE in a normal-form
game that is a convex combination of NEs (CCNE), without using a mediator;
the GLR protocol is a TFE if the players are computationally bounded.
We now provide a protocol similar in spirit to the one used in GLR that im-
plements a CCNE; our protocol is a computational sequential equilibrium if the
players are computationally bounded. Unlike GLR, we are able to apply our
approach to CEs in games with more than 2 players, as well as being able to
implement CCNEs that are not Pareto optimal. One more advantage of our
approach is that since we allow the underlying game to be one of imperfect in-
formation, there is a natural way to model a normal-form game (where players
are assumed to move simultaneously) as an extensive-form game: players just
move sequentially without learning what the other player does. Since GLR’s
results apply only to games of perfect information, they had to argue that they
could extend their result to normal-form games.
We require that the CCNE is of finite support, that all its coefficients are
rational numbers, and that each of the NEs in its support has coefficients that
are rational numbers.5 We call such CCNEs nice. Note that any CCNE can be
approximated to arbitrary accuracy by a nice CCNE.
Given a normal-form game G with a nice CCNE pi, we show how to convert
it to an extensive-form game Gcorr that implements this CE without using cryp-
tography, but using envelopes; that is, Gcorr has a sequential equilibrium with
the same distribution over outcomes inG as pi. We then show how to implement
Gcorr as a computational game using a cryptographic protocol.
5GLR also made these assumptions. In fact, they required a slightly stronger condition; they
required all the coefficients to be rational numbers whose denominator is a power of two.
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GivenG and pi, let ` be the least common denominator of the coefficients of pi.
Let Gcorr be the game where player 1 first puts an element of {0, . . . , `− 1} in an
envelope, then player 2 plays an element in {0, . . . , `−1}without knowing what
player 1 played (all the histories where player 2 makes his first move are in the
same information set of player 2). Then player 1 can either open the envelope
or destroy it. All the histories after player 1 opens the envelope form singleton
information sets for the other players; all histories after player 1 destroys the
envelope and 2 initially played j are in the same information set for the players
other than 1, for j ∈ {0, . . . , `−1}. ThenG is played. (Note that G might involve
many players other than 1 and 2, but 1 and 2 are the only players who play in
the initial part of Gcorr .) The players move sequentially: first player 2 moves,
then player 1 moves (without knowing player 2’s move), then player 3 moves
(without knowing 1 and 2’s moves), and so on. The payoffs of Gcorr depend
only on the players’ moves when playing the G component of Gcorr , and are the
same as the payoffs in G. See Figure 6.3 for a game Gcorr when ` is 2 and G is a
coordination game: that is, in G, each player moves either left or right, and each
gets a payoff of 1 if they make the same move, and -1 if they make different
moves.
Let σ be a NE in G in which player 1’s payoff is no better than it is in any
other NE in G. Now consider the following simple strategies for the players in
Gcorr . Intuitively, the players start by picking a NE in the support of pi to play,
with probability proportional to its coefficient in pi. To this end, fix an ordering
of length ` of the NEs in the support of pi, where each NE appears a number
of times proportional to its weight in the convex combination that makes up
pi. At the empty history, player 1 selects an action a uniformly at random from
{0, . . . , `− 1} and puts it in the envelope. Then player 2 also selects an action
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Figure 6.3: An example of the game Gcorr where ` = 2 and G is a coordina-
tion game
b uniformly at random from {0, . . . , `− 1}. Then player 1 opens the envelope.
The players then play the NE in place (a+ b mod `) in the ordering of NEs.
If player 1 does not open, the players play according to σ. Call the resulting
strategy profile ~σpi. It is not hard to verify that ~σpi implements pi, and that there
exists a probability measure µ such that (~σpi, µ) is a sequential equilibrium of
Gcorr . Defining µ is easy: the only information sets not reached with positive
probability (and hence µ is determined) are the one where “destroy” is played.
At that point, the players’ play σ, so they are best responding to each other, no
matter what their beliefs are.
So now all we have to provide is a computational game Gcorr that represents
Gcorr, where the games in Gcorr use cryptography instead an envelope for the
first part of the game. Let d be such that 2d−1 ≤ ` < 2d. Let Gcorr be the sequence
where Gn is the game where, at the empty history, player 1 commits to a d-
bit string by using d commitments in parallel, each with key length n − 1 and
outputs the d commitment strings as his action. Player 2 then plays a bitstring of
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length d that can be viewed as a binary representation of a number in {0, . . . , `−
1}. Player 1 then plays a string that is intended to be the commitment keys of
the d commitments. Then the players play a string representing their action inG
(again using its binary representation). The utility are then given by the utility
functions in G.
We now claim that Gcorr represents Gcorr.
Theorem 6.5.1 Gcorr represents Gcorr.
Proof: It is obvious that Gcorr is a computable uniform sequence. We now
show that it represents Gcorr. The mappings ~f of histories maps player 1’s com-
mitments to a string s to the action s mod `. (Notice that the fact we used d
commitments in parallel does not change the fact that the commitments are per-
fectly binding and thus this is well defined.) Actions of player 2 are mapped to
an action s mod ` according to their binary representation; if player 1 reveals d
valid keys in h, then in fn(h) he plays “open”, and otherwise he plays “destroy”;
the actions of G are mapped in the obvious way.
To show that UG4 holds, we proceed as follows: The mapping F for a player
j other than 1 and 2 is obvious: It is easy to compute using the TM R of the
commitment scheme if the commitments were opened successfully or not, so j
can compute at which information set of Gcorr he is at (given his view), and play
the binary representation of the action that the strategy plays at that information
set. For player 2, note that player 2’s first action in Gcorr can’t depend on player
1’s action, since player 2’s information set contains all the histories. Thus, a
deterministic strategy σ2 for player 2 in Gcorr just plays an action in {0, . . . , ` −
1}; F(σ2) just plays the same action at player 2’s first information set in Gcorr .
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Similarly to the other players, F(σ2) also plays the same action in G as σ2 when
player 2 is called upon to play again. Given a deterministic strategy σ1 for player
1, if σ1 plays a at the first step in Gcorr , F(σ1) chooses uniformly at random one
of the d-bit strings such that s = a mod ` (there are at most 2 such strings),
and plays the commitments strings C1(1n, s1, r1), . . . , Cd(1n, sd, rd), where r =
r1|| . . . ||rd is the prefix of the random tape representing the randomness used
to compute the commitment strings. To play the action “open”, it computes
ki = C2(1
n, si, ri) and play k1|| . . . ||kd; to play “destroy”, it plays k1|| . . . ||kd ⊕ 1
(a string other than the right keys). Again, it is obvious how player 1 plays in
G. It is easy to see that F(~σ) corresponds to ~σ, so UG4(a) holds. UG4(b) holds
for all players trivially given these strategies.
It is also obvious that UG4(c) holds for player 1. Since the information struc-
ture it faces at Gcorr and Gcorr is essentially the same, anything it can do in Gcorr
can be done by a strategy in Gcorr by just looking at the distribution of actions
in histories that map to each information set.
The other players have different information structures in Gcorr and Gcorr ,
since they see the commitment strings in Gcorr. We discuss UG4(c) for player 2
here; the argument in the case of the others is similar (and simpler). Let σi for
i 6= 2 be a strategy for player i inGcorr, and letMi = F(σi). LetM ′ be an arbitrary
polynomial time strategy for player 2 in Gcorr, and let Dn1 be the distribution
M ′’s first action in Gn; let Dnj,w be the distribution over the actions of M ′ in G
given that the commitment was opened successfully, player 1 committed to j,
and player 2’s first move was w; and let Dnw be the distribution over the actions
of M ′ in Gn if the commitment is not opened successfully and player 2’s first
move was w. Let σ′n be a strategy in Gcorr for player 2 that plays according
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to these distributions. We claim that {φGn(M1,M ′,...,Mc)}n is indistinguishable from
{ρGcorr(σ1,σ′n,...,σc)}n.
Let φGn,1(M1,M ′,...,Mc) be the distribution over histories ending at the first action of
player 2 when (M1,M ′, . . . ,Mc) is played inGn and mapped using fn to histories
of Gcorr, and let ρ
Gcorr,1
(σ1,σ′n,...,σc)
be the distribution over partial histories ending at
the first action of player 2 when (σ1, σ′n, . . . , σc) is played in Gcorr. We first claim
that {φGn,1(M1,M ′,...,Mc)}n is indistinguishable from {ρ
Gcorr,1
(σ1,σ′n,...,σc)
}n. Assume, by way
of contradiction, that it is not. This can happen only if, for infinitely many n,
M ′ plays some action a with probabilities that differ non-negligibly, depending
on whether it is faced with a commitment to different strings s or s′. But that
means that for infinitely many n, it can distinguish those two events with non-
negligible probability. This contradicts the assumption that the commitment
scheme is secure. (Note that it is easy to show that, because a single commitment
has the hiding property, then even when d such commitments are run in parallel,
no polynomial-time TM should be able to distinguish between commitments to
s and s′.)
It is easy to see that this also means that the distribution over partial histories
just before player 2 plays again are also indistinguishable. Now if the commit-
ment is opened successfully, then the information structure player 2 faces in
Gcorr is the same as in Gcorr , and thus the statement is obviously true. If the com-
mitments were not opened, than by using a argument similar to that used for
player 2’s first action, we can argue that if the distributions over partial histories
just after player 2 plays again are not indistinguishable, then again we can use
that as a distinguisher for the commitment scheme.
By Theorems 6.4.6 and 6.5.1, since ~σµ (with the appropriate beliefs) is a se-
133
quential equilibrium of Gcorr , F(~σµ) is a computational sequential equilibrium
of Gcorr .
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